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a b s t r a c t 
Safety-critical systems require a high level of safety and integrity. Therefore, generating such systems in- 
volves specific software building processes. Many domains are not traditionally involved in these types of 
software problems and must adapt their current processes accordingly. Typically, such requirements are 
developed ad hoc for each system, preventing further reuse beyond the domain-specific boundaries. This 
paper proposes a solution for software system development based on the reuse of dedicated subsystems, 
i.e., so-called dependability patterns that have been pre-engineered to adapt to a specific domain. We use 
Model-Driven Engineering (MDE) to describe dependability patterns and a methodology for developing 
dependable software systems using these patterns. Moreover, we describe an operational architecture for 
development tools to support the approach. An empirical evaluation of the proposed approach is pre- 
sented through its practical application to a case study in the railway domain, which has strong depend- 
ability requirements, to support a pattern-based development approach. This case study is followed by a 
survey to better understand the perceptions of practitioners regarding our approach. 
1. Introduction 
Safety-critical systems require a high level of safety and in- 
tegrity. Therefore, the generation of such systems involves spe- 
cific software building processes. These processes are often error- 
prone because they are not fully auto- mated, even if some level 
of automatic code generation or model-driven engineering sup- 
port is applied. Furthermore, many critical systems also have as- 
surance requirements, ranging from very strong levels involving 
certification (e.g., EN-50,129 ( CENELEC, 1999 ) for railway systems 
and DO-178B ( RTCA, 1992 ) for airborne systems) to reduced lev- 
els based on industry practices. These systems can be found in 
many application sectors such as automotive, aerospace, and home 
control, and come with many common characteristics, includ- 
ing real-time and temperature constraints, computational process- 
ing, power constraints and/or limited energy and common extra- 
functional properties such as dependability, security and efficiency 
( Ravi et al., 2004; Kopetz, 2011 ). 
The integration of various concerns, such as dependability, re- 
quires the availability of both application development and ex- 
pertise. Many domains not traditionally involved in this type of 
software development and must adapt their current processes ac- 
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cordingly. Typically, such requirements are developed ad hoc for 
each system, preventing further reuse beyond the domain-specific 
boundaries. This is especially true for railway systems, as they ex- 
ist in many use cases. Many of these systems belong to critical in- 
frastructures, where other economic and social aspects are based 
on. Hence capturing and providing this expertise via dependability 
patterns ( Daniels and Vouks, 1997; Powel, 2003; Tichy et al., 2004; 
Radermacher et al., 2013 ) has become recently an area of research. 
Dependability patterns enable the development of dependable ap- 
plications and liberate the developer from having to address tech- 
nical details. We believe that the specification and packaging of de- 
pendability patterns can provide an efficient means of addressing 
these problems, improving industrial efficiency and fostering tech- 
nology reuse across domains (the reuse of models at different lev- 
els), thus reducing the time and effort required to design a com- 
plex system ( McClure, 1997; Agresti, 2011 ). Model-driven engineer- 
ing (MDE) ( Selic, 2003; Atkinson and Ku ¨hne, 2003 ) also provides 
a very useful contribution to the design of safety-critical systems 
( Ziani et al., 2012; Panesar-Walawege et al., 2013 ) because it re- 
duces the time/cost required for understanding and analyzing sys- 
tem artifact descriptions due to the abstraction mechanisms. More- 
over, it reduces the cost of the development process thanks to the 
generation mechanisms. Hence, dependability pattern integration 
must be considered during the MDE process. 
In system and software engineering, design patterns ( Gamma et 
al., 1995; Henninger et al., 2007 ) are considered effective tools for 
the reuse of specific information. They are widely used today to 
provide architects and designers with reusable design knowledge. 
They are triples that describe solutions for commonly occurring 
problems in specific contexts. Indeed, pattern-based development 
has recently gained more attention in software engineering by ad- 
dressing new challenges that had not been targeted in the past 
( Henninger et al., 2007 ). In fact, they are applied in modern soft- 
ware architecture for distributed systems, including middleware 
and real-time embedded systems ( Schmidt and Buschmann, 2003 ). 
There are patterns for generic architecture problems ( Buschmann 
et al., 1996, 2007 ), security ( Schumacher, 2003 ; Fernandez, 2013 ), 
safety ( Alexander et al., 2007; Preschern et al., 2013 ) and other 
non-functional requirements ( Powel, 2003 ). The related approaches 
promote the use of patterns via reusable design artifacts. How- 
ever, a gap between the development of systems using patterns 
and the information in the pattern representations remains ( Zdun 
and Avgeriou, 2008 ). This becomes even more observable when ad- 
dressing specific concerns, such as dependability. 
In this paper, we present a model-based approach for depend- 
ability system and software engineering that uses patterns to rep- 
resent dependability solutions and knowledge, which fosters reuse. 
In such a vision, the dependability patterns derived from (resp. as- 
sociated with) domain-specific models are designed to assist the 
application developer integrate application models with depend- 
ability building-block solutions. Dependability patterns are defined 
from a platform-independent perspective (i.e., they are indepen- 
dent of the implementation) and are expressed in a consistent 
manner with domain-specific dependability models. Consequently, 
they will be much easier to understand and validate by applica- 
tion designers in a specific area. This work is conducted within 
the context of a model-based security and dependability research 
project, and our collaboration with safety-critical system suppliers 
suggested a need for this work. The dependability solutions used 
by safety-critical system developers are based on the application 
domain and occasionally on the software development environ- 
ment, including the design and coding stages. There is a need to 
link these concepts to dependability, which will ease the certifica- 
tion process. The lack of appropriate links between application do- 
main concepts and dependability concepts poses three main chal- 
lenges. First, the dependability engineer must re-engineer its exist- 
ing solutions. Second, the application designer may not understand 
domain-specific dependability solutions. Finally, it is very difficult 
for the system developer to guarantee the availability of depend- 
ability solutions to cover all the dependability requirements of the 
targeted application using the application domain concepts. 
To provide a concrete example, we introduce a railway case 
study from the TERESA project 1 called Safe4Rail, which is a 
simplified version of a real ETCS (European Train Control Sys- 
tem) ( UNISIG, 2009; Stanley, 2011 ). The main functionality of this 
demonstrator is to ensure that the traveled speed and distance 
do not exceed the authorized maximum values provided by the 
railway infrastructure. To implement this functionality, the system 
is composed of multiple subsystems, including the European Vi- 
tal Computer (EVC), which executes the safety application, and a 
set of odometry sensors and actuators. The odometry sensors pro- 
vide the speed and acceleration of the train. With these values, the 
system must be able to calculate accurate speed and position val- 
ues (odometry). There is a family of products in the railway sector, 
including regional trains, tramways, and high-speed trains. These 
units share common parts, although they differ in distinct ways. 
For example, consider the calculation of the actual speed and po- 
1 http://www.teresa-project.org/ . 
sition by Safe4Rail. The implementation varies according to each 
type of train product, which depends on the safety level to be met 
and the type and number of sensors and actuators that are in- 
volved. These considerations greatly influence how each product 
is implemented because several issues should be considered: the 
number of channel redundancies, the diversity of the channels, the 
monitoring of the channels, and the interaction with assorted data 
(type, weight, etc.). 
A proprietary embedded system has been designed to meet 
stricter safety regulations. In our case, the SIL4 level is pursued. 
To achieve this level, several design techniques from related stan- 
dards, such as IEC-61,508 ( IEC, 2010b ) and EN-50,126 ( CENELEC, 
1999 ), are used, including redundancies, votations, diagnostics, and 
secure and safe communications. Hence, capturing and providing 
this expertise by means of a repository of dependability patterns 
and models can enhance the development of embedded systems. 
We seek mechanisms that allow a safer, easier and faster safety- 
critical development process. To illustrate this statement, two dif- 
ferent railway industry scenarios are described. The first takes 
place within a railway manufacturing group, whereas second oc- 
curs within an SME. 
Scenario 1. Railway manufacturing group. The first scenario takes 
place within a group of railway manufacturers. The group is di- 
vided into subsidiary companies that specialize in the development 
of train and railway infrastructure systems (e.g., traction, central 
control, infotainment, railway signaling, interlocking, Communica- 
tion Based Train Control (CBTC) ( IEEE, 2004 ), etc.). The group in- 
tends to develop its own safety-related subsystems instead of buy- 
ing them from providers and competitors. The problem is that 
the engineering cost associated with these safety-related systems 
is relatively high; moreover, the number of qualified engineers is 
limited. Additionally, safety concepts and design patterns are not 
present in commonly used modeling languages (e.g., UML, SysML, 
etc.), which leads to design ambiguity. The expected benefits for 
this scenario are the following: (1) reduce product development 
cost and time by reusing design patterns for other projects and 
companies, and (2) reduce the probability of systematic faults by 
reducing ambiguity. 
Scenario 2. SME company. In the second scenario, an SME that de- 
velops safety-related embedded systems is presented. This com- 
pany has proven experience in the development of IEC-61,508- 
based safety-related embedded systems, although the company has 
little experience in the railway domain. If this company wants to 
enter the railway market, it must overcome a great barrier and an- 
alyze relevant railway standards, adapt the solutions it has been 
using for years in other sectors, and be ready for success. Some of 
the problems are the same as those that arise in the first scenario: 
the development cost for safety-related systems is high, and the 
number of qualified engineers is limited. Additionally, in this con- 
text, systems are developed with different standards derived from 
IEC-61,508 (the differences are well known). The expected benefits 
for this scenario are the following: (1) reduce product development 
cost and time, with the cross-domain reuse of design patterns be- 
tween projects; (2) reduce the probability of systematic fault by 
reducing ambiguity; and (3) provide a cross-domain arsenal of de- 
sign patterns that can be used in new domains. 
To address issues related to scenario 1, an infrastructure that al- 
lows the reuse of the most common techniques used to achieve the 
dependability requirements in most subsystems would allow these 
subsidiaries to reduce efforts, and costs while also reducing the 
number of required and scarce safety experts. With regard to the 
issues related to scenario 2, we offer an infrastructure that allows 
the cross-domain reutilization of the techniques used to achieve 
the target safety level. 
1.1. Solution overview 
To address the above problem, we propose an approach that 
combines model-driven technology and pattern-based develop- 
ment to address the design of dependable applications. Our pro- 
posed approach makes use of patterns as is primary technique: 
Patten Based System Engineering (PBSE) . PBSE focuses on patterns; 
from this perspective, it addresses two types of processes: pat- 
tern definition and system development with patterns . Metamodeling 
techniques are used to represent patterns at a greater level of ab- 
straction. Therefore, patterns can be stored in a repository and can 
be loaded for desired properties. As a result, patterns can be used 
as bricks to build applications through a model-driven engineer- 
ing approach. The associated framework promotes an infrastruc- 
ture for the modeling of dependability patterns and provides spe- 
cific transformation engines that can adapt and generate different 
representations, where patterns are clearly related to domain mod- 
els. Supported by an MDE tool suite, PBSE assists the dependable 
system engineering process. The resulting tool-chain supports the 
two categories of users: “reuse” consumers and “reuse” producers. 
The former category comprises developers who reuse existing arti- 
facts from the repository, whereas the latter comprises developers 
of artifacts to be stored in the repository. Such an MDE tool suite 
utilizes Domain-Specific Modeling Languages (DSMLs) ( Gray et al., 
2007; Strembeck and Zdun, 2009 ) built on an integrated repository 
of modeling artifacts that function as a group, where a pattern is at 
the heart of development – its role should be specified in all life- 
cycle stages of development. We use the open-source Eclipse Mod- 
eling Framework (EMF) ( Steinberg et al., 2009 ) and its extended 
version, Eclipse Modeling Framework Technology (EMFT) 2 to build 
the support tools for our approach. The EMF provides an imple- 
mentation of the EMOF (Essential MOF), which is a subset of the 
Meta-Object Facility (MOF) ( OMG, 2008 ) called Ecore 3 . The EMF of- 
fers a set of tools to specify metamodels in Ecore and to generate 
other representations. 
1.2. Intended contributions 
In order to empirically assess the proposed approach and tool- 
ing, we provide evidence of its benefits and applicability through 
an example of a representative industrial case from the TERESA 
project, i.e., the Safe4Rail application. The case study indicates that 
our approach is feasible in a real industrial context and that it 
can provide useful guidance in reusing existing solutions. This case 
study is followed by a survey to better understand the percep- 
tions of practitioners regarding our approach. The survey indicates 
that practitioners agree on the benefits of adopting our approach 
in a real industrial context. The new approach permits faster pro- 
duction and reduces staff using proven solutions instead of hiring 
expensive dependability engineers. Because the pattern conceptual 
model can be applied to multiple problems through a simple ex- 
tension, these results suggest our work has wider applicability and 
usefulness. In summary, the work presented in this paper has the 
following features: (1) a dependability pattern-based approach as 
a new method for software system engineering based on the reuse 
of patterns; (2) the design of a set of DSMLs to specify the patterns 
that is independent of the end-user development applications and 
execution platforms; (3) the development of a set of tools to sup- 
port the proposed approach; (4) the application of the approach in 
the context of railway systems; and (5) a survey to better under- 
stand the perceptions of industry practitioners regarding our ap- 
proach. 
2 https://eclipse.org/modeling/emft/ . 
3 Ecore is a meta-meta-model. 
Fig. 1. Domain specific standards derived from IEC 61,508. 
The basic formulation of the approach presented in this article 
has been previously published in a research paper at the 16th In- 
ternational System Design Languages Forum on Model-Driven De- 
pendability Engineering ( Hamid et al., 2013 ). This work extends the 
ideas described in the earlier paper and presents a holistic ap- 
proach to the modeling of pattern-based software systems with 
strong dependability requirements. Specifically, we provide a more 
comprehensive and complete description of our approach ( Section 
3 ) and tool support ( Section 4 ), along with substantial new empir- 
ical results to show the feasibility and usefulness of our approach 
( Section 5 ). 
1.3. Outline 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. An 
overview of the modeling framework, including the development 
context, is presented in Section 2 . In section 3 , we present our 
approach to support the pattern-based system and software de- 
pendability engineering. Section 4 describes the architecture of the 
tool suite and presents an example implementation. In Section 5 , 
we present an empirical evaluation of our approach through the 
TERESA railway case study and a survey of key performance indi- 
cators. In Section 6 , we discuss the contribution with regard to cer- 
tification. Related work is discussed in Section 7 . Finally, Section 
8 concludes and sketches future work directions. We investigate 
a few open issues, primarily the issues of generalization and im- 
plementation, including the usability of the proposed modeling 
framework. 
2. Background 
The engineering of embedded systems with safety requirements 
typically requires the certification of such products according to 
generic (e.g., IEC-61,508 ( IEC, 2010b )) or domain-specific standards 
(e.g., EN-5012X ( CENELEC, 1999 )). System engineers must develop 
a system that complies with required standards, implementing rec- 
ommended techniques and measures. The cost-effective develop- 
ment and certification of such products is a challenge, and the 
reusability of proven solutions (design patterns) enables cost and 
time-to-market reductions. Our work aims at providing a new en- 
gineering approach that allows these solutions (techniques and 
measures) to be reused for development within the same appli- 
cation domain or in a cross-domain scenario. 
Many domain-specific standards are derived from IEC-61,508, 
as shown in Fig. 1 . The main characteristic of these standards 
is that they all share several features (i.e., QM, V&V, life cycle, 
techniques and measures, etc.) of the main standard, IEC-61,508, 
whereas other specific parts are solely related to each application 
domain itself. These standards provide a specific set of techniques 
and measures that must be implemented to achieve the desired 
level of safety integrity of an application (either to avoid system- 
atic faults or to control random faults). To foster reuse, developers 
must adapt the requirements and design solutions of these stan- 
dards to the concepts of the application domain. As described be- 
low, a subset of techniques and measures proposed in the stan- 
Fig. 2. Reference safety engineering process for railway signaling. 
dards can be used to define several dependability patterns used in 
the demonstrator ( Section 5 ). 
Furthermore, most of these techniques and measures are pro- 
vided in the form of design decisions targeting one stage of the 
development lifecycle without effective realization. In addition, the 
format in which the techniques and measures are presented must 
be improved to ensure that the provided solutions are storable, 
reusable and appropriate for the automation of software develop- 
ment and analysis. An ontological approach for describing design 
patterns and their relationships was proposed in ( Girardi and Lin- 
doso, 2006 ) to facilitate understanding and reuse during software 
development. 
Finally, development processes for system and software con- 
struction are common knowledge and mainstream practice in 
most development organizations. Fig. 2 shows major activi- 
ties/deliverables associated with a reference railway safety engi- 
neering process, where items in green are new or different com- 
pared with the IEC-61,508 standard. Every phase receives input 
documents and defines a set of activities to perform and a set 
of output documents to generate. The activities are assigned with 
roles and may require specialized tools. The items in green are 
either not relevant (e.g., validate the system) or not considered 
within the scope of our case study (e.g., hazard log). In addition, 
there is a high level of compatibility between the IEC-61,508-3 
and EN-50,128 software safety standards, especially regarding their 
software lifecycles and safety techniques. The engineering of em- 
bedded systems with safety has been well established ( IEC, 2010b ), 
although methods and tools to support it are lacking. 
Therefore, there are two main prerequisites to define the 
pattern-based dependability engineering methodology. The first is 
that it must be compatible with current development processes. 
The objective is not to change the habits of the engineers; instead, 
easing the acceptance of the approach in industry is the goal. The 
second prerequisite is that it must be flexible enough to adapt to 
other specific processes in other domains. 
We seek a solution based on the reuse of software subsystems 
that have been pre-engineered to adapt to a specific domain. The 
approach described in Section 3 uses MDE techniques to handle 
the issues described above. Fig. 3 shows the overall life-cycle for 
a safety related system, from concept to disposal. This figure has 
been extracted from the standard IEC-61,508. Compared to exist- 
ing methodologies from relevant standards, our work enhances the 
provided methodology only during the realization phase , although 
it may have a positive impact in subsequent phases of the overall 
product lifecycle, i.e., from concept to disposal. 
3. Approach 
A system architect must work at different levels. Integrating 
all subsystems while considering the associated dependability re- 
quirements in a seamless fashion is challenging given the vari- 
ous critical requirements and uncertainties. We propose a solu- 
tion for software system development based on the reuse of dedi- 
cated subsystems, so-called dependability patterns that have been 
pre-engineered to adapt to a specific domain. The patterns that 
are at the heart of our system engineering process reflect design 
solutions at the domain-independent and domain-specific levels. 
We use Model-Driven Engineering (MDE) to describe dependability 
patterns and a methodology for developing dependable software 
systems using these patterns. The resultant modeling framework 
reduces the time/cost related to understanding and analyzing sys- 
tem artifact description due to the abstraction mechanisms, and it 
reduces the cost of the development process due to the generation 
mechanisms. 
The proposed approach (as illustrated in Fig. 4 ) is composed of 
six main steps (the numbers in parentheses correspond to those 
in Fig. 4 ). The first step (step 1) is responsible for the creation 
of the conceptual model of dependability patterns. The resulting 
conceptual model is used to build a DSML to specify dependabil- 
ity patterns (step 2). The dependability expert with the help of 
the system and software engineering expert uses this DSML to de- 
fine dependability patterns (step 3). Then, a domain process expert 
adapts the dependability patterns into a version that is suitable in 
its system development process (step 4). An example is adaptation 
Fig. 3. Overall safety life-cycle (IEC-61,508). 
Fig. 4. Methodology for the creation of the PBSE modeling framework. 
for compliance with an appropriate standard. We then develop and 
apply appropriate transformations of a pattern representation in a 
suitable format for the development environment (step 5). Pattern 
instantiation as the initial activity to apply a pattern is performed 
during steps 4 and 5. Finally, the domain engineer reuses the re- 
sulting adapted and transformed patterns for the given engineering 
environment (development platform) to develop a domain appli- 
cation (step 6). The pattern integration-application in the designs 
activity is performed during this step. 
The first two steps (1 and 2) are performed once for a set of do- 
mains. The inputs of these steps are expertise, standards and best 
practices from the dependability expert. Step 3 is performed once 
for a set of domains. Step 4 is performed once per application do- 
main. Performing step 3 requires knowledge of dependability engi- 
neering, whereas step 4 requires knowledge of both dependability 
engineering and the system development process for a specific ap- 
plication domain. Step 5 is performed once for each development 
environment. Step 6 is performed once for every system in the ap- 
plication domain. This step requires the availability of knowledge 
on the specific targeted system and dedicated tools that are cus- 
tomized for a given development platform. In the rest of this sec- 
tion, we present detailed descriptions of the six steps in our ap- 
proach. 
3.1. Step 1: conceptual model of dependability patterns 
The idea of design patterns was introduced by an architect (Ur- 
banist), Christopher Alexander ( Alexander et al., 1977 ), not by a 
software developer. The first objective was to enhance architec- 
tural quality, beauty, elegance and harmony to avoid dehuman- 
ization of the living environment. Design patterns have a certain 
number of elements that must be captured by means of a pat- 
tern specification language. In GoF ( Gamma et al., 1995 ), a de- 
sign pattern extracts the key artifacts of a common design struc- 
ture that make it useful for creating a reusable object-oriented de- 
sign. In our context, we refine the GoF specification to fit with the 
non-functional needs. Adapting the security pattern definition of 
( Schumacher, 2003 ), we define a dependability pattern as a descrip- 
tion of a particular recurring dependability problem that arises in 
specific contexts and presents a well-proven generic scheme for its 
solution. Therefore, a system of dependability patterns is a collection 
of dependability patterns and the relevant guidelines for their im- 
plementation, combination and practical use in dependability en- 
gineering. 
Dependability patterns are defined from a platform- 
independent perspective (i.e., they are independent of their 
dedicated implementation mechanisms); they are expressed in 
a consistent way with domain-specific models. Consequently, 
they are much easier to understand and validate by application 
designers in a specific area. To capture this vision, we introduce 
the concept of the domain perspective , where a dependability 
pattern at the domain-independent level exhibits an abstract 
solution without specific knowledge of how the solution is im- 
plemented with regard to the application domain. The objective 
is to reuse the domain-independent model dependability patterns 
for several application domains and allow them to customize 
those domain-independent patterns with their domain knowledge 
and/or requirements to produce their own domain-specific arti- 
facts. Thus, the question of how to support these concepts should 
be captured in the specification languages. 
To foster the reuse of the best practices in software design 
through patterns, patterns rely on describing the concepts in an 
abstract way (i.e., domain-independent) and leave it to the soft- 
ware developer to create an implementation. In contrast, our de- 
pendability patterns support the software developer in the task of 
exploiting existing implementations. The knowledge of specific im- 
plementations using application domain constructs is captured in 
domain-specific patterns and thus supports the refinement step. 
Pattern refinement takes advantage of the fact that applications in 
the same domain, such as railway systems, have common require- 
ments/standards and perform comparable dependability functions. 
The modeling framework presented in this paper provides sup- 
port for three levels of abstraction: (i) a pattern specification meta- 
model (SEPM), (ii) a domain-independent pattern model (DIPM), 
and (iii) a domain-specific pattern model (DSPM). This decompo- 
sition allows design applications within the context of depend- 
ability by avoiding the extensive complexity that is normally in- 
troduced when combining dependability and domain-specific arti- 
facts. Moreover, this approach assists with overcoming the lack of 
formalization related to the classical textual pattern form. 
Definition 1. (Domain). A domain is a field or a scope of knowledge 
or activity that is characterized by the concerns, methods, and mecha- 
nisms employed in the development of a system. The actual clustering 
into domains depends on the given group / community implementing 
the target methodology. 
In our context, a domain may include knowledge of protocols, 
processes, methods, techniques, practices, OS, HW systems, mea- 
surement and certification related to the specific domain. For ex- 
ample, in the group of safety standards, IEC-61,508 is a domain- 
independent standard, whereas EN-50,126, EN 81 and ISO-26,262 
are a railway domain- specific standard, an elevator domain stan- 
dard and an automotive domain standard, respectively. 
To specify dependability patterns, we build on a metamodel for 
representing these patterns in the form of a sub-system provid- 
ing appropriate interfaces and targeting dependability properties 
to enforce the dependability system requirements. The so-called 
external interfaces are used to make the pattern’s functionality 
available to the application, whereas the technical interfaces sup- 
port interactions with dependability primitives and protocols of 
the application domain, including HW platforms. We capture the 
dependability capabilities of the pattern through a novel concept 
called Dproperty . 
With regard to the artifacts used in the system under develop- 
ment, the first-class citizens of the domain are identified to spe- 
cialize these artifacts. For example, the specification of a pattern in 
the domain-independent perspective is based on software design 
constructs. The specification of such a pattern for a domain uses 
a domain protocol to implement the pattern solution (see the ex- 
ample of a safety communication pattern given in Sections 3.3 and 
3.4 ). For this purpose, we introduce two concepts: DIPattern and 
DSPattern . 
These concepts and their related observations are used as a 
basis for our conceptual pattern modeling language (see Section 
3.1.2 ). The following subsection describes an example to emphasize 
the issues identified in this paper. Then, the first level of abstrac- 
tion, namely, the metamodel, is described. 
3.1.1. Motivating example: safety communication pattern 
As an example of a commonly and widely used pattern, we 
choose the safety communication pattern ( IEC, 2010a ). In the fol- 
lowing, the terms safety communication pattern and black chan- 
nel pattern are used interchangeably. Distributed safety systems re- 
quire (safe) data communication between distributed safety func- 
tions. For example, the presence of random failures in the transfer 
of data within different levels of an application, such as transmis- 
sion errors, repetitions, and deletions, can lead to a loss of infor- 
mation or to improper delivery of information. In a safety-related 
system or application, data communication is a vital part of their 
development. This communication could occur at different levels, 
i.e., on chips, inter-boards, or systems. A safety communication 
pattern is required for safety-related systems, where the data com- 
munication is directly involved in the implementation of its safety 
function. 
The main purpose of the safety communication pattern is to 
provide a simple way to guarantee that the communication at dif- 
ferent levels in a system is reliable and to provide the capability 
to guarantee the correct transmission of information to the right 
destination and at the right time through a standard communica- 
tion mechanism. The functionality of this pattern is based on the 
detection of a random software/hardware failure during communi- 
cation. Safety standards let the designer use a standard commu- 
nication mechanism to share the information in a safety function, 
although the reliability of the information is guaranteed through 
internal safety interfaces, which has the following connotations: 
• The elements that share the information must be safety- 
relevant. 
• The platform must support the implementation of an Error De- 
tection Code (EDC). 
This strategy leaves the responsibility of this task (at the in- 
terfaces of the elements participating in the communication) to 
detect failures during communication at different levels, such as 
chips, inter-boards, and systems. The safety communication pat- 
tern provides specific interfaces to guarantee the reliability of the 
information transfer and the authenticity of the participants in the 
communication. More specifically, the participants in the commu- 
nication could be independent hardware channels, internal mod- 
ules, etc. 
Let sender and receiver be two elements acting as communica- 
tion participants. Let sender it f (resp. receiver it f ) be a sender in- 
terface (resp. receiver interface). 
The sender it f offers the following services: 
• Generate an identifier for establishing the sequence of the in- 
formation to be sent. 
• Generate an identifier for the source and receiver of the infor- 
mation. 
• Generate an EDC; to detect failures in the information transfer. 
• Pack the information before sending it over the standard com- 
munication mechanism. The receiver it f offers the following 
services: 
• Unpack the information. 
• Check to package before to use the received information to ex- 
amine the following aspects: 
– the origin of the information (source), 
– the destination of the information (receiver), 
– the order of the information received and 
– that the information has not been corrupted. 
• Send the received information to the receiver. 
It is important to ensure that the actions of sending and receiv- 
ing the safety message are cyclical and periodical because elements 
involved in the communication must always know when the mes- 
sage should be sent and when it should be received. It is impor- 
tant to synchronize both parts of the communication process. How 
to protect elements that share the information and how to provide 
the error detection code remain critical problems. 
However, these safety communication patterns are slightly dif- 
ferent with regard to the application domain. For example, a sys- 
tem domain has its own mechanisms and means to serve the im- 
plementation of this pattern, primarily the technique used to en- 
able reliable delivery of data over unreliable communication chan- 
nels. Depending on the type of failures to be detected and the di- 
agnostic coverage to be achieved, the EDC can be implemented us- 
ing a set of protocols, such as repetition codes, parity bits, check- 
sums, Cycle Redundancy Checks (CRCs) and hash functions. To 
summarize, they are similar in their goal and different in their im- 
plementation issues, e.g., determining the level of communication 
in which the pattern is used and the restrictiveness and efficiency 
of the expected solution. Thus, the motivation is to handle the 
modeling of patterns by the following abstraction. In what follows, 
we propose using CRCs ( Peterson and Brown, 1961 ) to specialize 
the implementation of the safety communication pattern. This so- 
lution is already used at the hardware and operating system levels 
to detect failures. 
3.1.2. Pattern specification metamodel (SEPM) 
To foster the reuse of patterns in the development of critical 
systems with dependability requirements, we extend a metamodel 
from ( Hamid et al., 2016 ) for representing dependability patterns 
in the form of a subsystem that provides appropriate interfaces 
and targeting dependability properties to enforce the dependabil- 
ity system requirements. Interfaces are used to exhibit a pattern’s 
functionality and to manage its application. In addition, interfaces 
support interactions between dependability primitives and proto- 
cols within a specific application domain. The principal classes of 
the system and software engineering pattern metamodel (SEPM) 
are described with Ecore notations in Fig. 5 . Their meanings are 
explained in more detail in the following paragraphs. 
• SepmPattern. This block represents a dependability pattern as 
a subsystem that describes a solution for a recurring depend- 
ability design problem arising in a specific design context. A 
SepmPattern defines its behavior in terms of provided and re- 
quired interfaces. Larger pieces of a system’s functionality may 
be assembled by reusing patterns as components of an encom- 
passing pattern or an assembly of patterns; the required and 
provided interfaces are wired together. A SepmPattern may be 
manifested by one or more artifacts. 
• SepmDIPattern. This is a SepmPattern that denotes an abstract 
representation of a dependability pattern at the domain- inde- 
pendent level. This is the key entry artifact to model patterns 
at the domain-independent level (DIPM). 
• SepmInterface. A SepmPattern interacts with its environment 
via SepmInterfaces, which are composed of operations. A Sepm- 
Pattern represented the provided and required interfaces. A 
provided interface highlights the services exposed to the envi- 
ronment. A required interface corresponds to services required 
by the pattern to function properly. We consider two interface 
types: 
- SepmExternalInterface. This allows the implementation of 
interactions to integrate a pattern into an application model 
or to compose patterns. It represents the application ele- 
ment to be used during the pattern integration- application 
in the designs. In other words, such a pattern element will 
be replaced with one element from the application design, 
or created if it exists in the pattern but not in the applica- 
tion (as will be detailed in Section 3.6 ). Moreover, it will be 
used to reason about the pattern properties and its provided 
design solution. 
- SepmTechnicalinterface. This allows the implementation of 
interactions with dependability primitives and protocols, 
such as error detection, and specialization for specific un- 
derlying software and/or hardware platforms during the de- 
ployment activity. It represents the platform element to be 
used during the pattern integration-application in the de- 
signs. In other words, such a pattern element will be re- 
placed with one element from the application domain, or 
created if it exists in the pattern but not in the application. 
Please note that an SepmDIPattern does not have SepmTech- 
nicalInterfaces. 
Fig. 5. An overview of the SEPM. 
For our example, one may identify the following external inter- 
faces: 
– send(S,d, t). The application sender S sends data d at time t . 
– receive(R,d,t). The application receiver R receives data d at time 
t . 
– send(P,d,crc,n,t). The pattern sender participant P sends data d 
at time t with certain CRC crc and a sequence number n 
– receive(Q,d,crc,n,t). The pattern receiver participant Q receives 
data d at time t with a certain CRC crc and a sequence num- 
ber n . 
• SeReference. This link is used to specify the relationship be- 
tween patterns with regard to the domain and software lifecy- 
cle stage in the form of a pattern language. For example, a pat- 
tern at a certain software lifecycle stage uses another pattern 
at the same or at a different software lifecycle stage. SeRefer- 
enceKind contains examples of these links. 
• seArtifact. We define a modeling artifact as a formalized piece 
of knowledge for understanding and communicating ideas pro- 
duced and/or consumed during certain activities of system en- 
gineering processes. The modeling artifact may be classified in 
accordance with engineering process levels. 
• SeLifecycleStage. A SeLifecycleStage SeLifecycleStage defines the 
development lifecycle stage in which the artifact is used. In our 
study, we focus on dependability pattern models. In this con- 
text, we use the pattern classification of Riehle and Buschmann 
( Riehle and Züllighoven, 1996; Buschmann et al., 1996, 2007 ). 
• SepmProperty. This is a particular characteristic of a pattern re- 
lated to the concern of interest and is dedicated to capturing its 
intent. Each property of a pattern is validated at the time of the 
pattern validating process, and the assumptions are compiled 
as a set of constraints that must be satisfied by the domain ap- 
plication. Additionally, this concept will serve for pattern clas- 
sification and identification. The dependability attributes from 
( Avizienis et al., 2004 ) are categories of dependability proper- 
ties. For our example, we define the following dependability 
properties: 
- integrity of data. When data d are received by the application 
receiver R , those same data d are sent out by the application 
sender S . 
- data freshness. It is often desired that the transmitted data 
d are recent. This property states that when an application 
receiver R receives data d , the same data are sent by the 
application sender S at most Delta t ago. 
- non duplication. Given data that are sent by the application 
sender S, a receiver R receives these data at most the same 
number of times they were sent. 
• SepmConstraint. This is a set of requisites of the pattern. If 
the constraints are not met, the pattern is not able to deliver 
its properties. For our example, we specify constraints on the 
CRC computation/checking algorithms, on the correct/incorrect 
transmission over the network and on the maximal network 
delay. 
• SepmInternalStructure. This constitutes the implementation of 
the solution proposed by the pattern. Thus, the InternalStruc- 
ture can be considered as a white box that exposes the de- 
tails of the SepmDIPattern and the SepmDSPattern. To capture 
all the key elements of the solution, the SepmInternalStructure 
manifests two types of structures: static and dynamic. One pat- 
tern can have several possible implementations, providing sup- 
port for pattern variability. 
• SepmDSPattern. This is a refinement of SepmDIPattern (as will 
be detailed in Section 3.4 ). It is used to build a pattern at the 
domain-specific level (DSPM). Furthermore, a SepmDSPattern 
has Technical Interfaces to interact with the platform. This is the 
key entry artifact to model the pattern at the DSPM. 
3.2. Step 2: creation of a DSML from a conceptual model of 
dependability patterns 
To create model instances of the proposed metamodels, we 
must provide concrete syntaxes. The DSML’s concrete syntax may 
be described in any syntax type (textual, tree-structured, tabular, 
diagrammatic, etc.), depending on the corresponding artifact. For 
our purpose, we propose using the well-known approach in MDE: 
a DSML that contains pattern-specific information for several soft- 
ware and system modeling languages and different development 
environments. This approach is useful because we are storing a li- 
brary of design patterns in a common repository and are providing 
one or more adaptations of each pattern to target several applica- 
tion domains, e.g., the railway industry, and different development 
environment domains, e.g., UML. However, our vision is not limited 
to DSML. For example, in ( Radermacher et al., 2013 ), we defined a 
UML profile under the UML papyrus tool 4 to specify patterns. 
In our context, we use a mixed syntax that combines 
structured-tree syntax and a UML-based diagrammatic syntax to 
describe the SEPM’s concrete syntax. The basic idea is that the 
former defines problems, objectives and constraints, whereas the 
diagrammatic part defines roles and solutions (SepmInternalStruc- 
ture). The objective behind this separation is that a solution de- 
fined in the pattern can be integrated (without losing information) 
into the application architecture only if both are specified in the 
same modeling language, e.g., UML. Conversely, the problem state- 
ment and objectives are independent of the chosen modeling lan- 
guage. The separation enables solutions defined in different model- 
ing languages to share the same problem definition, which is use- 
ful because we are storing design patterns in a common repository 
where model specifications in the structured-tree syntax are sepa- 
rately managed and stored. A pattern might eventually have multi- 
ple solutions defined in different modeling languages. The pattern 
discovery, i.e., the mechanisms to browse or search patterns within 
the repository, are based on the non-diagrammatic part. 
3.3. Step 3: definition of dependability patterns 
Once we have developed the DSML’s concrete syntax in Step 2, 
we can create the set of dependability patterns to share the de- 
pendability expertise within the domain of interest. During this 
step, the patterns are constructed such that they conform to the 
metamodel description adopted in Step 1. To foster technology 
reuse across domains, the patterns are stored in a repository, such 
as the one described in ( Hamid, 2014 ), thus reducing the amount 
of effort and time needed to design a complex system. 
Furthermore, in the context of our work, we use validation re- 
ports and documentation generation techniques to validate each 
pattern. If a pattern is correctly defined, i.e., it conforms to its 
modeling language, then the artifact is ready for publication in the 
repository. Otherwise, we can identify any issues from the report 
and rebuild the pattern by correcting or completing the relevant 
constructs. Additionally, each pattern is studied to identify its re- 
lationships with other patterns belonging to the same application 
domain based on the engineering process activity in which it is 
utilized. The purpose of this activity is to organize patterns into a 
set of pattern systems. Moreover, this step should include all activ- 
ities that support pattern producers in managing the relationships 
among these patterns, which can be defined in pattern relationship 
model libraries. At each stage (phase) n of the system engineering 
development process, the patterns identified in the previous stage 
(phase) n − 1 can assist in the selection process during the cur- 
rent phase. As a prerequisite, we specify model libraries for the 
classification of patterns. At each stage of the system engineering 
development process, the appropriate patterns are identified via a 
classification process. Other work has adopted a similar conceptu- 
alization of a pattern-based development approach in the scope of 
safety engineering (e.g., ( Hauge, 2014 )), or in the scope of security 
engineering (e.g., ( Uzunov et al., 2013 )). 
After an initial analysis of the various artifact sources, including 
standards and existing applications, the designer determines the 
stage of the engineering process lifecycle (system concept, system 
architecture, software architecture, and detailed module design) in 
which each pattern can be defined; moreover, whether the pattern 
is domain-independent or domain-specific can be determined. For 
this purpose, we choose to use the pattern classification of Riehle 
4 http://eclipse.org/papyrus/ . 
and Buschmann ( Riehle and Züllighoven, 1996; Buschmann et al., 
1996, 2007 ), who defined system patterns, architectural patterns, de- 
sign patterns and implementation patterns to create the SeLifecy- 
cleStage model library. In addition, a pattern may be linked with 
other patterns and associated with property models using a prede- 
fined set of reference types, on a very high level ( Noble, 1998 ) or 
including details on what part of a pattern is used, refined, or com- 
bined ( Hauge, 2014 ). Here, we create the SeReferenceKind model li- 
brary to support the specification of relationships across artifacts 
(e.g., refines, specializes and uses ) as an extension of the relation- 
ship classification proposed in ( Noble, 1998 ). 
In the context of our work, certain patterns have a meaningful 
representation at the system level, at which general system blocks 
are defined and domain concepts are expressed (e.g., system re- 
dundancy). However, their representations might not be directly 
refined in later phases because they represent concepts that are 
meaningful at only the architectural level. In contrast, other pat- 
terns might be meaningful only in later design phases as indirect 
specializations of an architectural concept, e.g., a data agreement 
software pattern is a specialization of an architectural system re- 
dundancy pattern. In addition, the same pattern may have multiple 
instantiations and specializations in each phase (e.g., a watchdog 
driver is linked to a hardware component). Therefore, as shown 
in Fig. 6 , a given design pattern (P2) in the repository might fol- 
low a tree-shaped refinement and specialization flow, representing 
different lifecycle phases, different refinements and specializations, 
and new pattern representations in later phases. The following is 
an example of specialization through the process: 
1. P2 (at System Concept Specification phase): Black Channel 
2. P22 (at System Architecture Design phase): Ethernet-Based, 
Star-Topology Black Channel 
3. P221 (at Software Architecture Definition phase): Ethernet- 
Based, Star-Topology Black Channel with CRC and sequence 
number monitoring 
4. P2212 (at Module Detailed Design phase): Ethernet-Based, Star- 
Topology Black Channel with CRC and sequence number moni- 
toring 
The target representation is the DIPM level, while still conform- 
ing to the SEPM metamodel. At the DIPM level, this description 
reveals the following elements: interfaces of type SepmExternalIn- 
terface, dependability properties of type SepmProperty and solutions 
of type SepmInternalStructure. Moreover, for classification (respec- 
tively relationship) purposes, additional information may be de- 
fined, e.g., lifecycle stages of type SeLifecycleStage (respectively re- 
lationships of type SeReference). 
The first task is to create a basic pattern subsystem as an in- 
stance of the SepmPattern. The instance is given a name and a 
set of attributes that correspond to the pattern. The description, 
with varying levels of abstraction, is managed by inheritance. Once 
the basic pattern subsystem is specified, interfaces are added to 
expose some of the patterns functionalities. For each interface, an 
instance of SepmExternaInterface is added to the patterns interface 
collection. The next step after creating interfaces is the creation 
of property instances. An instance is created in the patterns prop- 
erty collection to specify every identified dependability property. 
A property is given a name and an expression based on external 
interfaces in a property language. 
We continue our illustration using the example of the safety 
communication pattern . For the sake of simplicity, we specify only 
those elements related to both steps 2 and 3that are required to 
explain our approach. As introduced in Section 3.1.1 , data commu- 
nication must be safe, which leads to two possible approaches ( IEC, 
2010a ): 
1. White channel: Use of a safety communication channel that 
is designed, implemented and validated according to the IEC- 
Fig. 6. Tree-shaped pattern refinement and specialization. 
Fig. 7. Safety communication pattern structure. 
61,508 standard ( IEC, 2010b ) and the IEC-61,784-3 ( IEC, 2003 ) 
or IEC-62,280 ( IEC, 2002 ) standards using a certified safety 
communication channel, such as TTEthernet (TTE) 5 . 
2. Black channel: Use of a communication channel that is not de- 
signed or validated according to the IEC-61,508 standard, where 
safety measures can be implemented either in the safety func- 
tions or in interfaces with the communication layer in accor- 
dance with the IEC-61,784-3 or IEC-62,280 standards. The latter 
is called a safety communication layer (SCL) . 
As shown in Fig. 7 , the safety communication pattern is an ap- 
plication level service on top of a non-safety-related communica- 
tion stack (“comms”) that enables “safe” data exchange between 
safety functions. It must be defined according to a life cycle equiv- 
alent to the highest safety level (SIL) in the application, requiring 
the detection of all possible communication errors, such as corrup- 
tion, incorrect message order, message outside temporal require- 
ments, message lost, message duplicated, etc. 
In our example, an instance of SepmPattern is created and 
called SCL . Fig. 8 shows the SCL pattern for the software architec- 
ture. An encapsulation unit is used to prepare the data message 
to be sent and a de-encapsulation unit to extract the information 
from the message once it has arrived. The receiver provides an in- 
terface where some extra information is added in the sent mes- 
5 http://www.tttech.com/products/ttethernet/ . 
sage, which will be checked by the receiver. This information in- 
cludes (1) a safety code for the receiver to verify the integrity of 
the message and (2) a sequence number to ensure the correct ar- 
rival order. The sender is also responsible for maintaining a mini- 
mum transmission rate that is specified by the requirements of the 
application. Moreover, the receiver provides an interface to check 
the received message. This interface includes (1) a safety code to 
ensure the integrity of the message, (2) a sequence number, which 
guarantees that the received message is new and not a replica trav- 
eling into the communication channel, and (3) a transmission qual- 
ity checker to react if it falls below a predefined level. 
3.4. Step 4: adaptation for a specific domain 
At the DSPM level, the dependability pattern and some of its re- 
lated elements are also created by inheritance. Once a SepmDSPat- 
tern is created, every pattern external interface is identified and 
modeled as a refinement of the DIPM’s SepmExternalInterface in 
the pattern’s interfaces collection. Then, following the pattern’s de- 
scription of the particular solution that is represented, each of the 
pattern’s technical interfaces is identified and modeled by an in- 
stance of SepmTechnicalInterface in the pattern’s interfaces collec- 
tion. 
In the context of our experiment, the railway domain-specific 
pattern must be compliant not only with the generic safety stan- 
dards but also with railway-specific safety standards. Fig. 9 shows 
the SCL pattern for the software architecture. The encapsulation 
and de-encapsulation units described in the domain-independent 
perspective are refined into sequencer, CRC calculator and software 
watchdog units. This combination of elements enables the detec- 
tion of errors. A sequence number is added to the data message 
to detect an incorrect order of messages and/or messages that are 
lost. A CRC code is added to the data message to detect message 
corruption. Each message has an associated period, and a watch- 
dog is used to detect whether the message arrival time is within 
the specified time range. Thus, the sender provides an interface 
in which extra information is added to the sent message, which 
will be checked by the receiver. This information includes (1) a 
safety code (CRC) to detect message corruption and (2) a sequence 
number to detect an incorrect order or lost messages. Moreover, 
the receiver provides an interface to check the received message 
through a CRC checker. To detect message corruption, the receiver 
computes a CRC and compares it with the one provided by the 
sender. However, there are other possible realizations, e.g., using 
Fig. 8. Black channel for software architecture. 
a sequence number checker or using a quality checker through a 
software watchdog. 
3.5. Step 5: adaptation for a specific domain development 
environment 
The final step (step 6) is performed to support the development 
of a specific system in the application domain. As a prerequisite, 
step 5 identifies appropriate patterns and creates tailored versions 
that represent model concepts in the domain of interest and that 
can be adapted to both the system development process and the 
development environment. The selection of a pattern is primarily 
the choice of the developer. There are various considerations that 
may narrow and simplify this choice. The first is the purpose of 
the pattern application. Although this purpose cannot be generally 
formalized, certain patterns address requirements that are defined 
by domain standards (e.g., safety). If these requirements are stored 
in a model library and are referenced in the definitions of the pat- 
terns, then the selection of patterns could be driven by the selec- 
tion of (domain) requirements. The second consideration is that 
patterns can be classified with respect to several properties. One 
of which is the stage of the engineering process lifecycle discussed 
in Section 3.3 – a pattern may be relevant to the system, its archi- 
tecture, or to aspects of its design or implementation. Thus, it must 
be possible to filter available modeling artifacts based on this clas- 
sification. 
In our context, the mappings from dependability pattern mod- 
els, which are formalized in a SEPM description language, for 
a specific domain development environment are supported via 
model transformations. Once the repository is available 6 , patterns 
can be imported/exported from the repository as XMI standard 
files that are compatible with processes: Identification and Tailor- 
ing . 
Definition 2. (Identification). Identification activities support sys- 
tem engineers in selecting appropriate solutions from the reposi- 
tory. This activity makes it possible to search for and retrieve pat- 
terns in accordance with the system requirements. The identifica- 
tion activity consists of the following tasks: 
1. Define needs. 
2. Search for patterns in the repository. 
3. Select the appropriate patterns from those proposed by the 
repository. 
Definition 3. (Tailoring). A tailoring activity involves the retrieval 
of a pattern and its related model libraries from the repository and 
their incorporation into the target development environment. This 
activity enables the reuse of a pattern. The tailoring activity con- 
sists of the following tasks: 
1. Adapt the selected patterns for the domain-specific process of 
interest. 
2. Import the tailored patterns by transforming them into the 
domain-specific development environment. 
In the context of our work, the target domain development en- 
vironment is IBM Rational Rhapsody 7 , and the descriptions of the 
6 The repository system populated with modeling artifacts. 
7 http://www-03.ibm.com/software/products/en/ratirhapfami . 
Fig. 9. Railway black channel software architecture. 
model transformations are based on the QVT operational language. 
Therefore, the design of a given pattern can be regarded as a single 
package that contains one sub-package per lifecycle phase of the 
engineering process; each of these phases can contain design mod- 
ules and additional sub-packages associated with particular spe- 
cializations and refinements. Thus, imported patterns are stored in- 
side a dedicated package that facilitates searching within the pack- 
age tree of each design. Moreover, to foster reuse, the pattern arti- 
facts related to that phase are instantiated from the repository to 
the vehicular modeling tool as a reference package. As shown in 
Fig. 10 , each pattern design package generally contains the follow- 
ing items: 
• Any information that is required by the end-user pattern in- 
tegrator, e.g., a UML class or SysML block, with interfaces that 
enable the interconnection of patterns with a given system de- 
sign. 
• Additional detailed information of interest, e.g., a “structure”
package that contains the static internal structure (e.g., class di- 
agram) and the dynamic structure (e.g., sequence diagram). 
3.6. Step 6: reuse for a specific system development 
This section focuses on the use of patterns in a software devel- 
opment process. The integration of a pattern involves the applica- 
tion of a solution provided by that pattern in an existing applica- 
tion architecture to take advantage of its benefits. We cannot sim- 
ply copy such a solution into the architecture under development. 
Instead, we must account for the interplay between elements that 
already exist in the application and the elements of the pattern. 
The challenge of this task is that the relationships (e.g., connec- 
tions, associations or inheritances) defined between elements in 
the pattern definition must also be established in the application 
model. Currently, integrating a pattern requires adding new con- 
nections, associations, and other factors, and the user must resolve 
potential conflicts. 
To address this issue, a specific activity called Integration , which 
was already studied in ( Hamid et al., 2012 ), is used herein. 
Definition 4. (Integration). An integration activity is performed 
within the development environment when a pattern and its re- 
lated model libraries are introduced into an application design; it 
allows the elements of the application to be organized for con- 
sistency with the elements of the pattern. The integration activity 
consists of the following tasks: 
1. Preparation. The elements of the pattern are extracted in the 
form of a role diagram to match/merge them with the elements 
of the existing application model. 
2. Elicitation. Connections between the application model and the 
pattern based on the role diagram are constructed. This phase 
is responsible for defining the elements of the application that 
are used to fulfill the roles identified in the pattern. 
3. Consolidation. The pattern is merged with the application. For 
certain elements of the pattern, they may simply be replaced 
with elements from the application or newly created elements 
may be added as they exist in the pattern. 
4. Adaptation. An optional phase that offers the opportunity for 
tailored integration by allowing the user to refine the new ap- 
plication is conducted. 
Fig. 10. Pattern design deployed in packages using the IBM Rational Rhapsody tool. 
In the context of our example, by executing a tailoring activity, 
the pattern is exported in an XMI file. Then, it must be imported 
from Rhapsody. This two-step approach is an intermediate solu- 
tion for the purpose of demonstration. The envisioned future solu- 
tion is to install a plug-in in the design tool so that patterns can 
be imported without external software. As shown in Fig. 10 , once 
the pattern is imported in Rhapsody as a package, a project tree is 
generated and its artifacts are available in the project. Therefore, in 
each phase, the system developer executes the search/select task 
on the repository to tailor appropriate patterns for the modeling 
environment using the identification and the tailoring processes 
described in Section 3.5 . The developer then integrates them into 
the application models following an incremental process. For ex- 
ample, the process flow at the software architecture phase can be 
summarized by the following steps: 
1. The software architect searches for different specializations (at 
the software architecture-definition level) of the patterns to 
complement the design. 
2. The software architect selects the appropriate set of identified 
patterns. 
3. The software architect imports the software architecture design 
perspective of each pattern into the vehicular modeling envi- 
ronment (Rhapsody) as a reference package. The application de- 
veloper is responsible for linking the pattern interfaces to inte- 
grate the pattern at that specific level. 
4. The software architect integrates the pattern into the existing 
software architecture design diagrams. 
4. Tool support 
In this section, we propose an MDE tool chain to support 
the proposed approach and assist the developers of model- and 
pattern-based dependable software systems. As discussed below, 
the proposed tool chain is designed to support the proposed meta- 
models; hence, the tool chain and the remainder of the activities 
involved in the approach may be developed in parallel. Appropri- 
ate tools for supporting our approach must fulfill the following key 
requirements: 
• Enable the creation of the UML class diagrams used to describe 
pattern metamodel in our approach. 
• Enable the creation of a concrete syntax. 
• Support the implementation of a repository to store pattern 
models and the related model libraries for classification and re- 
lationships. 
• Enable the creation of pattern models and the related model 
libraries and publication of the results into the repository. 
• Support the administration and the internal management of the 
repository. 
• Enable the creation of visualizations of the repository to facili- 
tate its access. 
• Enable the creation of application models. 
• Enable transformations of the models from the repository for- 
mat into the target modeling environment. 
• Enable the integration of application models and imported pat- 
terns. 
• Support application-specific code generation. 
To satisfy the above requirements, we define four integrated 
sets of software tools: 
• Toolset A for populating the repository, 
• Toolset B for retrieval and adaptation from the repository, 
• Toolset C to serve as the repository software, including its ad- 
ministration and internal management, and 
• Toolset D as the augmented target development environment. 
There are several environments that can be used to build an 
MDE tool chain. In this work, the open-source Eclipse Model- 
ing Framework (EMF) and its extended version, Eclipse Modeling 
Framework Technology (EMFT) are used to build the support tools 
for our approach. All metamodels are specified using the EMF. The 
design tools are semi-automatically generated from these meta- 
models. Several enhancements are added to the generated code, 
such as creation wizards, to guide the modeling artifact designer 
in populating the repository. Visual enhancements are added to fa- 
cilitate the recognition of different concepts as a first step toward 
a future visual syntax. To describe the model transformations, the 
QVT operational language ( OMG, 2008 ) is used. The repository is 
implemented using the Eclipse CDO 8 framework. However, our vi- 
8 http://www.eclipse.org/cdo/ . 
Fig. 11. Pattern designer schematic. 
sion is not limited to the EMF platform. Other modeling tools con- 
forming to the requirements of Section 4 can also be used. For ex- 
ample, in ( Radermacher et al., 2013 ), we investigated the use of 
UML papyrus and its support for the definition of UML profiles to 
provide tool support for the approach. 
Our approach is successfully applied to a case study of PBSE. 
Specifically, we develop Semcomdt 9 (SEMCO model development 
tools) as an MDE tool chain to support all the steps in our ap- 
proach. Semcomdt offers the following features: 
• Gaya for specifying and implementing a repository to store 
models, 
• Arabion for specifying patterns that conform to SEPM , and 
• Retrieval for repository access. 
For populating the repository, we construct a pattern design 
tool (Arabion) to be used by a pattern designer. Arabion interacts 
with the Gaya repository for publication purposes. As described 
below, and already described in Section 3.2 from a DSML construc- 
tion perspective, design patterns are composed of two parts, as vi- 
sualized in Fig. 11: 
• Structured-tree component. Pattern definition that defines pat- 
tern properties and attributes, such as safety properties, re- 
source constraints, development phases, and relationships. 
These data are used to ease pattern search and analysis ( Hamid, 
2015 ). 
• UML-based diagrammatic component. Pattern internal structure 
design files generated via additional tools, e.g., Rhapsody or Pa- 
pyrus (UML editors), that are stored as XMI files and can be 
attached to the pattern description file. 
The pattern design environment is presented in Fig. 12 . There 
is a design palette on the right, a tree view of the project on the 
left and the main design environment in the middle. Furthermore, 
Arabion includes mechanisms for verifying the conformity of the 
pattern with the SEPM metamodel and for publishing the results 
to the repository. 
For access to the repository by a system engineer, the retrieval 
tool provides a set of functions to assist in the search, selection 
and sorting of patterns. For example, as shown in Fig. 13 , the tool 
assists in selecting appropriate patterns through key word searches 
and lifecycle stage searches. The results are displayed in the search 
result tree as system, architecture, design and implementation pat- 
terns. The tool includes features for export and tailoring using di- 
alogs that are primarily based on model transformation techniques 
to adapt pattern models to the target development environment. 
With regard to Tool set D, IBM’s Rational Rhapsody Devel- 
oper/Software Architecture 10 is used to provide tool support for 
the other parts of our approach. Other modeling tools can be used 
9 http://www.semcomdt.org . 
10 http://www.ibm.com/developerworks/rational/products/rhapsody/ . 
in accordance with the target application domain and/or model- 
ing environment. In addition to meeting its expected requirements, 
Rhapsody is a mature and well-established tool in the industry, 
making it easier to provide support for our approach and making 
our approach more likely to be adopted by practitioners, such as 
those engaged in railway safety-related processes. Rhapsody also 
allows for application-specific codes to be automatically generated 
(except for some specific parts that are coded by hand). 
Rhapsody is used as the domain-specific design software tool 
to design (and implement) the system using UML/SysML modeling 
languages. For example, it can be used to design systems based 
on packages, where one package might contain design diagrams 
and/or additional packages. Based on this approach, the design of a 
given pattern can be considered a single package that contains one 
sub-package per safety engineering process lifecycle phase; each 
of these phases might contain design modules and additional sub- 
packages associated with specializations and refinements. Thus, the 
access tool provides the option to export patterns in a format that 
can be imported by the Rhapsody tools. Therefore, a customized 
access tool, such as the one shown in Fig. 14 , is developed to con- 
struct connections between the railway development environment 
and the repository of patterns. The access tool offers a GUI that 
allows the user to search for and select patterns. When a pattern 
is selected, the access tool instantiates the pattern in the domain- 
specific tool. Because this task is performed during product devel- 
opment, the selected pattern must be compliant with the current 
phase of the domain process and with the user tools. By accessing 
the repository, we introduce features based on model transforma- 
tion techniques to adapt the pattern model to the target develop- 
ment environment. In our work, the target format is a subset of 
UML that can be imported using Rhapsody and the model transfor- 
mations as developed using the Eclipse implementation of QVTO. 
The left-hand side of Fig. 14 shows the main window of the 
railway access user interface. This window has two panels: one 
for searching and the other for display. The display panel on the 
bottom shows the name of the selected pattern and its different 
views, e.g., a graphic view with a class diagram of the pattern im- 
plementation. Searching the repository is performed using either 
the “Name” field to enter part of the name or “Keywords” to en- 
ter the desired pattern characteristics. To import the selected pat- 
tern into the development environment, as shown on the right- 
hand side of Fig. 14 , the access tool creates a new representation of 
the selected pattern as a UML package for Rhapsody using model 
transformation techniques. 
To assist in the integration step, we provide support for the var- 
ious phases. However, certain development environments may al- 
ready offer native integration support. As shown in Section 3.6 , a 
binding must be established between elements of the application 
architecture and the roles defined in the pattern. The integration 
tool supports the developer in two different ways. The first is that 
it enables a filtered selection of possible elements for binding to 
be displayed. The second is that it provides the completely auto- 
mated creation of bindings. If a role remains unbound during in- 
tegration, the developer can indicate that it has no corresponding 
element in the application and that a suitable element must be 
created in the application model. For example, in ( Radermacher et 
al., 2013 ), we used UML collaborations ( OMG, 2011a ) for model- 
ing patterns and for role binding to establish links between ele- 
ments of the application architecture and the roles defined in a 
pattern. Furthermore, every design pattern has certain constraints 
that must be satisfied while allowing for a certain degree of mod- 
ification. Thus, there is a need to ensure that the properties of the 
pattern remain valid while not preventing acceptable modifications 
(such as renaming). A verification rule associated with each pat- 
tern ensures that the invariants of the pattern can be checked after 
the pattern has been applied. These validation rules are currently 
Fig. 12. Designing a pattern. 
Fig. 13. Access tool. 
implemented in the programming language of the target develop- 
ment environment (e.g., C ++ , Java, etc.); alternatively, a constraint 
language, such as Object Constraint Language (OCL) ( OMG, 2010 ), 
could be used. However, the realization of such rules is beyond the 
scope of this paper. 
5. Evaluation 
In this section, we first report on an industrial case study per- 
formed in the railway domain ( Section 5.1 ), followed by a descrip- 
tion of a survey performed among railway domain experts to bet- 
ter understand their perceptions of our approach ( Section 5.2 ). The 
case study enables us to determine that the pattern-based ap- 
proach leads to a reduced number or to a simplification of the 
engineering process steps, whereas the survey assists in assess- 
ing whether domain experts agree on the benefit of adopting the 
pattern-based approach in a real industrial context. 
5.1. Case study 
In the context of the TERESA project, we evaluate our approach 
in the construction of an engineering discipline that is adapted to 
resource constrained systems by combining the MDE process and a 
model-based repository of dependability patterns and their related 
property models. 
In this subsection, the adaptation of railway processes to incor- 
porate the pattern-based approach is described. We test which of 
the provided tools are able to support the pattern integration or 
assist the engineering process. In this context, the extendibility of 
the pattern repository with new patterns and the extendibility of 
existing patterns are observed. Furthermore, we evaluate the use- 
fulness of the patterns with respect to increasing engineering pro- 
ductivity. In the presentation of the case study and its results, we 
describe only a small portion of this system. We do not show the 
complete resulting model because it contains proprietary informa- 
tion from our industrial partner. 
5.1.1. Nature of the case study 
One of the case studies that serves as a TERESA demonstrator 
is set in the railway domain. For confidentiality reasons, we do not 
reveal the name of the collaborating partner. This is a very con- 
servative domain in which dependability is a key requirement for 
most subsystems. Thus, the railway domain is a highly appropriate 
sector in which to apply our approach. It is not uncommon to find 
Fig. 14. Railway access tool. 
Fig. 15. ERTMS/ETCS diagram. 
situations in this industrial domain in which the reuse of system 
and software modeling artifacts by means of a repository could 
accelerate and support the development of safety-related subsys- 
tems. We demonstrate the applicability of our proposed frame- 
work using the Safe4Rail demonstrator, which is a simplified ver- 
sion of a real ETCS (European Train Control System) for signaling, 
control and train protection (see Fig. 15 ). Additionally, for confi- 
dentiality reasons, we use a small but realistic setting to illus- 
trate the dependability pattern-based approach proposed herein. 
The main functionality of this demonstrator is to ensure that the 
speed and distance traveled do not exceed the authorized max- 
imum values specified by the railway infrastructure. Safe4Rail is 
responsible for emergency braking in a railway system. Its task 
is to detect whether the brake should be activated. Most impor- 
tantly, the emergency brake must be activated when something 
goes wrong. 
At every position, the braking curve provides three speed lim- 
its, which are used to make decisions about when to activate the 
brakes (see Fig. 16 ): 
1. When the current speed exceeds the warning speed limit, the 
system must activate a warning signal to advise the driver that 
the train is approaching a dangerous speed. 
2. If the driver does not take any action and the service speed 
limit is exceeded, the system must activate the service brake. 
Fig. 16. ERTMS/ETCS supervision limits and braking curves. 
3. If the train continues accelerating and exceeds the final limit, 
the system will deactivate the acceleration and activate the 
emergency brake to stop the train completely. 
The fundamental functionality of the system is based on a set 
of inputs from the rail track, assorted sensors, balises, etc. Begin- 
ning with these inputs, it performs various calculations to deter- 
mine whether the emergency brake should be activated. An output 
signal is sent if necessary. Fig. 17 provides an overview of the en- 
tire system architecture; a description for each subsystem that con- 
tributes to the system is also provided. Furthermore, the following 
list provides the requirements to fulfill by these components: 
1. Clock . Generates a periodic event that triggers the system to 
estimate the current position and speed and to supervise the 
train to ensure it complies with the current track restrictions. 
2. Environmental conditions . Represent the physical interaction be- 
tween the environment (train, track, etc.) and the sensors of the 
system. 
3. Balise . Represents a balise installed on the track that supplies 
the train supervision system with new information regarding 
the current position and the track conditions. 
4. Safe Train Interface . Represents the actuators for the application. 
5. Supervision system . 
(a) Balise reader . Detect and read the information provided by 
the balise on the rail. 
(b) Supervision . The main component of the system responsible 
for carrying out the functionality of the system. 
(c) Sensors . Provide the system with the actual position and 
speed of the train and the track conditions. 
(d) User interface . The driver interacts with the system through 
this interface. 
A more complete description of these components can be found 
in TERESA, (2013 ). 
5.1.2. Description of the application 
The safety requirements of the proposed case-study are ex- 
tracted from a simplified analysis of the ERTMS/ETCS standard and 
considering that the objective of the case study is not the devel- 
opment of the complete certifiable and interoperable ERTMS/ETCS 
system but the provision of a case study that is as realistic as 
possible and can be developed within the scope our study. In the 
Safe4Rail system, there are three main cases, which are described 
below. Fig. 18 provides a diagram of the selected cases, illustrat- 
ing their relationships and their classification as safety-relevant or 
non-safety-relevant cases. These use cases can be described as fol- 
lows: 
1. Activate emergency brake and perform diagnostics (when the 
system is in standby mode). 
2. Supervise train speed and position (when the system is in su- 
pervision mode). 
Fig. 17. Safe4Rail system components. 
Fig. 18. Part of a Safe4Rail use-case diagram. 
(a) Estimate current position and speed. 
i. Obtain sensor data. 
ii. Obtain balise data. 
iii. Calculate current position and speed. 
(b) Supervise the current position and speed and activate warn- 
ings and brakes accordingly. 
i. Process release emergency brake command. 
(c) Provide information to the user. 
3. Switch between the standby and supervision modes. 
Based on the previous analysis, the following safety require- 
ments are specified and shown in Fig. 19 . The requirements de- 
scribed below are a summary (with some revisited information) of 
the safety requirements: 
1. (SIL4) Supervise train traveling speed and distance. The sys- 
tem shall ensure that the train’s traveling distance and travel- 
ing speed do not exceed the maximum authorized safety val- 
ues, which are the movement authority (MA) and speed pro- 
files, respectively. 
(a) (SIL4) Odometry. The system estimates the traveling speed 
and distance with bounded absolute errors (ABS DIST ERR 
MAX and ABS SPEED ERR MAX for a maximum distance 
between DIST MAX BALISE and a maximum speed of 
500 km/h). 
(b) (SIL4) Mode. The system safely manages modes and their 
transitions: 
i. No power. The system remains in a safe state. 
ii. Standby. The system remains in a safe state. 
iii. Supervision: The system ensures that the train travel- 
ing distance and traveling speed do not exceed the max- 
imum authorized values for safety, namely, the move- 
ment authority (MA) and speed profiles, respectively. 
(This implies the execution of multiple sub-safety func- 
tions, such as ’communicate with control centers’, ’limit 
supervision’, etc.) 
(c) (SIL4) Limit supervision: Limit supervision. The system up- 
dates the maximum distance and maximum speed pro- 
files with received commands and compares the estimated 
traveling distance and speed (odometry) with these limits. 
If any ’safe authorized limit’ is exceeded (distance and/or 
speed), the safe state is activated. 
Fig. 19. A portion of the Safe4Rail requirements (software). 
Table 1 
List of patterns. 
Pattern Origin 
Hypervisor EN-50,129 (Table E.4; Separation of safety-related sys-tems from non safety-related systems) 
Watchdog EN-50 ,126, IEC-61,508–3 (Table A.11) 
Triple Modular Redundancy (TMR) IEC-61 ,508-2 (Tables 2 and 3), EN-50,129 (Table E.4) 
Majority Voter IEC-61,508-2 (Table A .2,A .3A .4) 
Reciprocal Monitoring IEC-61 ,508–2 (Table A.4),EN-51,028 (Fault Detection & Diagnosis) 
Data Agreement Book ”Real-Time Systems:Design Principles for Dis-tributed Embedded Applications”
Black Channel - Safety Com-munication Layer IEC-61 ,508–2 / IEC-61,784 
(d) (SIL4) Rearm: Once the safe state is activated by the ’limit 
supervision’ safety function, the system can be rearmed (re- 
lease emergency brake) only when the ’train is stopped’ and 
the ’driver commands rearm’. 
2. The safe state is when the emergency brake is activated (which 
means that the system is in the safe state, i.e., the train is 
stopped). 
5.1.3. Results 
Here, we present the results of our case study. Because we ele- 
ments of this study were discussed in Sections 3 and 4 to explain 
our approach, we provide only an overview of the outcomes of the 
case study (steps 3–6). 
Definition of dependability patterns (step 3). In this step, the 
system architects analyze system safety requirements and identify 
possible safety patterns to be used. Table 1 presents the list of pat- 
terns to be used in the railway demonstrator. This list populates 
the repository of dependability patterns for the railway domain 
through the MDE tool set presented in Section 4 . 
The Arabion editor is used to create the corresponding set of 
seven patterns. Arabion uses a set of property libraries to deter- 
mine the type of the pattern properties. Then, pattern publication 
into the repository is triggered by running the publication feature 
of Arabion. However, the publication feature requires that the vali- 
dation tool be executed to guarantee pattern design validity. In the 
context of this study, we examine only conformance validity with 
regard to the pattern metamodel. However, formal verification may 
be applied using an additional verification framework ( Rodano and 
Giammarc, 2013; Hamid et al., 2016 ). Finally, the repository man- 
agement tool is used to define the relationships between the pat- 
terns. 
Adaptation for a specific domain (step 4). The domain-specific 
perspective of the pattern is dependent on the solution/product; 
each (commercial) implementation provides different characteris- 
tics and features. In the context of our work, a railway-specific 
model is constructed based on previous patterns using the tool 
suite. Here, we present a subset while focusing on the specific rail- 
way realizations. 
• Hypervisor. The hypervisor virtualizes the real platform hard- 
ware to allow the application and the operating system (par- 
tition) to “feel like” they are executed in a standalone manner 
on real hardware. The commercial hypervisors are XtratuM, 11 
RTS hypervisor, 12 and Lynx hypervisor. 13 
• Watchdog. The watchdog checks whether the monitored appli- 
cation or a particular (safety) application process is running 
into its time base or executed in the correct order ( Powel, 
2003 ). Two possible watchdog architectures are possible: (1) 
with a time window (or time range watchdog), which defines 
two different time periods for the monitoring process (i.e., Tlow 
and Thigh), and (2) without a time window, where a unique 
time-out value is considered (Tmax). 
• Triple Modular Redundancy (TMR). This is a fault-tolerant re- 
dundant architecture in which three computational channels 
11 www.virtical.eu . 
12 www.caf.net . 
13 www.alstom.com/power/renewables/wind/ . 
perform a safety computation and the result is used to pro- 
duce a single safe output. The domain-independent version is 
defined according to the IEC-61,508-based fail-safe embedded 
system that provides a single random hardware fault-tolerance 
(HFT = 1; IEC-61,508-2, Table 3). The railway-specific version 
is defined according to the EN-50,126-based fail-safe embed- 
ded system with a “composite fail-safety” technique (EN-50,129 
B.3.1 Effects of single faults, Table E.4). 
• Majority Voter. According to IEC-61,508, the majority voter is a 
safety technique that provides a safe output based on the ma- 
jority principle ( M out of N , e.g., 2 oo 3), masking failures in one 
of at least three hardware channels. In the railway-specific ap- 
plication, two new methods are added to represent two major 
majority vote types, i.e., the bit-exact voter and the approxi- 
mate voter. The bit-exact voter compares all input data bits, 
considering only inputs that are bit-identical as being equal. 
The approximate voter establishes a criterion to decide when 
inputs are considered equivalent to attain majority voting re- 
sults. 
• Reciprocal Monitoring. Also known as “monitored redundancy”
(IEC-61,508), is a monitoring and checking pattern between N 
data providers. If one of the providers is sending an erroneous 
data stream the other entities will detect and accuse it of hav- 
ing a fault. In our context, we consider the MooN reciprocal 
monitoring which is based a MooN Majority Voter to have the 
result of the voted data by the other computation units of the 
system. Once the vote has concluded it compares its own data 
and the data of the rest participants, if M or more computation 
units had a coherent answer to the vote the system is running 
in an acceptable way. If less than M computation unit have a 
coherent answer the system is running in a not acceptable way, 
or if the own computation unit has no coherent answer, the 
computation unit is turned to a fault-safe state. 
We use the same process flows as applied for the domain- 
independent representation, although the appropriate features of 
the toolset are used to create and deposit the corresponding 
domain-specific representations of these patterns into the repos- 
itory. 
System developer perspective: reuse of existing dependabil- 
ity patterns (steps 5 and 6). This process is relevant to both step 5 
(patterns identification and tailoring) and step 6 (integration). The 
first activity in this process is to construct an access tool for the 
railway domain, such as the one presented in Fig. 14 . In our case, 
the target format is a subset of UML that can be imported using 
Rhapsody. Thus, the set of railway patterns is imported into the 
Rhapsody environment as a set of packages using the railway ac- 
cess tool (see Fig. 10 ). 
In the safety railway process model, which is depicted in Fig. 
20 , the developer begins with engineering requirements and sub- 
sequent system specifications. In each phase, the system developer 
executes the search/select task on the repository to tailor appro- 
priate patterns for the modeling environment using the access tool 
and integrates these patterns into the application models following 
an incremental process. Fig. 21 shows the simplified flow for an it- 
eration within a software architecture definition phase. Moreover, 
the system developer can use the pattern designer tool (Arabion) 
to develop custom solutions when the repository fails to yield ap- 
propriate patterns during this phase. 
The safety concept diagram (see Fig. 22 ) provides a high-level 
architectural perspective in which major safety requirements, tech- 
niques and concepts used to augment the safety of the system are 
represented. The practical application of our approach begins at 
this point, where the system architect and RAMS (Reliability, Avail- 
ability, Maintainability, and Safety) architect open the access tool 
and log in. 
1. Both the system architect and the RAMS architect analyze the 
system safety requirements and identify the possible architec- 
tures and safety techniques to be used. They begin defining the 
European vital computer (EVC). They identify triple modular re- 
dundancy (TMR) as a design pattern of interest to reach a SIL4 
via a “composite fail-safety” technique (EN-50,129 B.3.1 Effects 
of single faults, Table E.4). As shown in Fig. 14 , they type and 
search the TMR to find the most suitable design pattern instan- 
tiation for this phase. They analyze all possible options, select 
“TMR@System” and click “Export”. By clicking the “Export” but- 
ton, the pattern is exported as a Rhapsody-referenced package 
to the selected directory. 
2. As shown in Fig. 14 , once the pattern is imported in Rhapsody 
as a package, a project tree is generated and its artifacts are 
available for use in the project 
3. Both the system architect and the RAMS architect continue re- 
fining the safety concept (see Fig. 22 ), searching for design pat- 
terns in the access tools and importing them whenever a suit- 
able design pattern is found: 
(a) The TMR requires an external safety hardware majority 
voter (its MajorityVoter) implemented with two indepen- 
dent majority voters. Majority voters require six digital out- 
puts of the TMR (three per majority voter, with each digi- 
tal output controlled by a different computation channel) to 
generate two independent emergency brake majority com- 
mands to the train interface (see Fig. 22 ). 
(b) The TMR is connected to the following safety and non-safety 
related subsystems (see Fig. 22 ). It follows the “separation 
of safety-related systems from non-safety-related systems”
technique described in EN-50,129 (Table E.4). 
i. Odometry input sensors (its OdometrySensors SC): A 
simplified odometry requires three (non-safety related) 
encoders (itsEncoderSensor SC), each of them connected 
end-to-end to a single computational channel 
ii. The (safety) balise reader (itsBaliseReader SC) 
iii. The (safety) DMI (itsDMI SC) 
(c) Initial decisions regarding the internal structure of the TMR 
(see Fig. 22 ): 
i. A black channel is selected to enable communication 
between the computation channels. Therefore, a safety 
communication layer pattern is already integrated. 
ii. A data agreement protocol can be used to reach an 
agreement regarding the input values to be used by the 
computation channels (input sensors are connected end- 
to-end to a single computation channel). This enables 
bit-exact execution of software to simplify diagnosis. 
(d) As shown in Fig. 22 , the replicated software executes 
the supervision safety function (Supervision-SystemPIM) 
and safety techniques (“DataAgreement” and “SafetyComm- 
Layer”). The system supervision function is based on three 
main functionalities (sensor reading, supervision, interface 
with balise reader and interface with the user (driver)). 
The main safety techniques are “TMR software redundancy”, 
“data agreement” and “safety communication layer”. 
The system architecture shown in Fig. 23 specifies the Safe4Rail 
system decomposition and the relationship between the different 
blocks that compose the system. At this stage, the system architect 
makes several architectural decisions (based on the safety concept 
and requirements) and accesses the repository to search and im- 
port suitable refined and specialized design patterns of interest: 
1. The TMR is implemented with the following features: 
(a) Three homogeneous nodes (“SupervisionNode”) connected 
to two Ethernet switches in star topology and composed of 
the following: 
Fig. 20. An overview of the railway reference process model. 
Fig. 21. Simplified process flow using our approach at the software architecture definition phase. 
Fig. 22. Overview of the Safe4Rail safety concept. 
i. a computing unit microcontroller (“ComputingUnit”, “Mi- 
crocontroller”), 
ii. an “FPGA” that provides safety and non-safety related in- 
puts/outputs (“IO Safety” and “IO No Safety”), 
iii. a watchdog as a pattern, 
iv. a software application (“SupervisionApplication”) exe- 
cuted at the computing unit that integrates the safety 
communication layer as a pattern to support safe com- 
munication between the replicated communication chan- 
nels, 
v. the use of a hypervisor (“DI SA BL Hypervisor”) as a pat- 
tern to enable integration in a single software application 
(“SupervisionApplication”) that contains the following: 
• safety software, such as software functionalities and 
safety techniques previously described in the safety 
concept, and 
• non safety-related application software such as the 
communication stack of the black channel. 
(b) Two Ethernet switches (“EthernetSwitch”) associated with a 
black channel. 
2. A single (safety) balise reader (“BaliseReader”). 
3. A black channel communication protocol (Ethernet/EtherCAT). 
During these phases, new design patterns are imported from 
the repository based on the system architect decisions. For exam- 
ple, the selection of a supervision node with a single microcon- 
troller results in the use of a hypervisor to integrate safety and 
non-safety-related software in a single microcontroller. 
The software architect continues refining the software architec- 
ture. The emergency supervision safety function shown in Fig. 23 is 
refined, leading to the software architecture shown in Fig. 24 . Then, 
additional software architectural decisions and analyses are made; 
additional safety techniques are identified. The software architect 
accesses the repository to search and import suitable refined and 
specialized design patterns according to the identified techniques 
and integrates them. Therefore, new patterns that are not repre- 
sented in previous phases are initially introduced at this phase. 
Fig. 23. Overview of the Safe4Rail system architecture. 
This is the case of the reciprocal monitoring pattern, which is only 
over interest at this stage. When the software architect must de- 
fine how to monitor the nodes, he/she can use the access tool to 
determine whether there is a pattern to implement this function- 
ality. The reciprocal monitoring pattern is selected, imported and 
integrated in the software architecture diagrams. 
5.1.4. Discussion 
This subsection has described the adaptation of railway pro- 
cesses to incorporate the proposed approach centered around a 
model-based repository of dependability patterns. The procedure 
used for developing the case study closely followed the approach 
described in Section 3 . Given the dependability pattern require- 
ments, a conceptual model is built that fulfills these design re- 
quirements. The next step is the creation of a Domain-Specific 
Modeling Language (DSML) for the specification of pattern mod- 
els. This work was done by the author. Then, the dependability 
expert, with the help of the system and software engineering ex- 
pert, defines the dependability patterns and begins populating the 
repository. Then, a domain process expert adapts the patterns into 
a format that is suitable for the system development process. Fi- 
nally, a domain engineer reuses the resulting pattern models that 
have been adapted and transformed for the given engineering en- 
vironment to develop a domain application. For the purpose of 
our study, we have developed Semcomdt (SEMCO Model Develop- 
ment Tools) as an MDE tool chain to support all steps of our ap- 
proach using EMFT. The repository is implemented using Java and 
the Eclipse CDO framework. 
The creation of the conceptual model of the dependability pat- 
tern required approximately 4 person months. The creation of the 
DSML for the dependability pattern took approximately 6 person 
months. The implementation of the MDE tool chain took 12 per- 
son months. The construction of the domain model (i.e., Safe4Rail 
system model) took another 3 person months. The process of pop- 
ulating the repository took one month. The proposed tool chain is 
designed to support the proposed metamodels, and hence, the tool 
chain and the remainder of the activities involved in the approach 
may be developed in parallel. This activity needs to be performed 
only once for a given set of domains. We expect the effort f or the 
creation of a DSML and the development of tools to be less for fu- 
ture applications, as we had to address several technical details in 
relation to using EMFT and CDO in our first application. We tested 
Fig. 24. Overview of the Safe4Rail software architecture. 
which of the provided tools were best able to support pattern in- 
tegration, thus assisting in the engineering process. In this context, 
the extendibility of the pattern repository with new patterns and 
the extendibility of existing patterns were observed. Furthermore, 
we evaluated to what extent such patterns are useful in increasing 
engineering productivity, as described in the following section. 
5.2. Survey 
After the completion of our case study, our approach and the 
solution of our case study were presented to industry practition- 
ers through a survey to collect feedback. This survey presents a 
preliminary evaluation of the proposed approach using Key Per- 
formance Indicators (KPIs). A performance indicator or key perfor- 
mance indicator (KPI) is an industry term referring to a type of 
performance measurement. KPIs are commonly used to evaluate 
the success of a particular activity, project or company. The objec- 
tive of the survey is to determine whether domain experts agree 
on the benefits of adopting the pattern-based approach in a real 
industrial context. In the following, we present and discuss the de- 
sign and results of this survey. 
5.2.1. Context and description of the methodology for experiment 
The approach and the solution of our case study presented in 
Section 5.1 were presented to the industry practitioners for evalu- 
ation. The purpose of this survey is to provide an overview of the 
software architecture for a small but sufficiently complex system 
that can be used to illustrate our proposed approach. Therefore, 
the estimations given for the railway domain provide two values 
with associated argumentation: 
1. Large and complex safety systems , such as on-board ERTMS/ETCS, 
and 
2. Intermediate safety systems , such as traction control safety su- 
pervision. 
Among the fifteen participants in the experiment, nine are 
TERESA members from the railway domain. Moreover, five depend- 
ability experts (DEPs) participated in the survey: three from the 
railway domain and two from other domains. Six software engi- 
neering (SENs) experts participated in the survey: four from the 
railway domain and two from other domains. In addition, four 
project managers (MGs) participated in the survey: two from the 
railway domain and two from other domains. 
The participants also knew that the experimenter did not have 
any influence on their job evaluation scores or on their career 
evolution and progress, as the experimenter was external to their 
organizations. Statistical analyses, mainly for the averages of the 
values provided by the participants, are performed by peers on 
anonymized data (both subjects and scales) independently from 
the experimenter. Moreover, the researcher agreed to use the sur- 
vey only for research purpose as anonymized results. 
We have created a questionnaire shown below, about the back- 
ground of the subjects related to dependability in general. We 
explained in the questionnaire that “dependability-related experi- 
ence” covers the following: (1) participating in the development of 
projects related to dependability; (2) constructing and reviewing 
dependability project reports and deliverables; (3) attending tuto- 
rials and workshops on dependability engineering processes and 
standards; and (4) self-reading of dependability engineering stan- 
dards. 
Q1. Is dependability engineering an important aspect of your 
job? 
• Yes 
• NO 
Q2. How much experience do you have with dependability en- 
gineering related activities? 
• Less than 6 Months 
• More than 6 months but less than 12 months. 
• More than 1 year but less than 2 years 
• More than 2 year 
The purpose of our study is to address the following two re- 
search questions: 
• RQ1: Does the proposed approach reduce the effort involved in 
developing a new application (design and implementation)? 
• RQ2: Is the effort involved to engineer a new version of an ex- 
isting application to add a dependability property acceptable? 
To address these two questions, we consider KPIs as a collection 
of metrics for quantifying the objectives of the approach, monitor- 
ing the related activities and assessing the expected results. The 
participants were asked to scale their estimation on a scale from 
0% to 100%, 0% being the lowest and 100% the highest value of es- 
timation regarding the different KPIs. The averages of the values 
provided by the participants are calculated for the analysis. To an- 
swer RQ1 , we evaluate whether the approach leads to a reduced 
number of steps in the engineering process or to their simplifica- 
tion, and we assess whether the domain experts agree on the ben- 
efits of adopting the approach in a real industrial context for the 
development of new applications. For RQ2 , we measure the ability 
of the approach to integrate dependability solutions into existing 
products. 
In the following, KPIs are presented with an estimated target 
value submitted at the beginning of the case studies, and real val- 
ues are estimated upon completion of the case studies. Both val- 
ues are averages because the individual values highly depend on 
certain factors, such as the size of the project, the product require- 
ments, the expertise of the engineering team, the use of the ap- 
proach facilities and the availability of the appropriate patterns. In 
both cases, KPIs are estimated based on previous knowledge of im- 
plementing such systems or equivalents. A description of the con- 
sidered constraints and assumptions is discussed below. 
1. Development costs. Cost reduction is at the forefront of the chal- 
lenges associated with system engineering. Nonetheless, meth- 
ods to reduce costs differ greatly. Reducing the cost of con- 
sumer electronics is typically bound to the hardware, whereas 
cost reduction for industrial embedded systems is primarily re- 
lated to the engineering times. In the context of our experi- 
ment, the railway domain follows the second criterion because 
only a few hundreds/thousands of devices are manufactured. 
Two examples of KPIs that can be used to measure the reduc- 
tion in cost are described as follows: 
• (K1) Overall engineering cost. Cost to develop a new appli- 
cation (design and implementation) with dependability re- 
quirements using a target reduction of 10% to 20% (on aver- 
age). 
• (K2) Percentage of reused code. Amount of code reused from 
existing patterns in a new development with dependability 
requirements using a target reduction of 20% to 60% (on av- 
erage). 
2. Time to market. Market pressures are forcing a continuous evo- 
lution of the systems present in the market. Consumer electron- 
ics is a good example, where every other day a new product 
appears. In general, there is a dual timing pressure, i.e., reduce 
the time to market of systems and reduce the time to market of 
new models of systems. Here, two example metrics to measure 
this reduction are described: 
• (K3) Engineering time. Time to develop a new application 
(design and implementation) with dependability require- 
ments using a target reduction of 10% to 25% (on average). 
• (K4) Re-engineering time. Time to engineer a new version of 
an existing application to add a dependability property with 
an estimated target reduction of 40% (on average). 
3. Product quality. Product quality is the degree to which customer 
needs and expectations are satisfied. Here, product quality is re- 
lated to the effectiveness and efficiency of the reused code from 
prior patterns. We provide two examples of metrics to measure 
this quality: 
• (K5) Errors in reused code. Number of errors appearing in 
code reused from patterns using a target value of 10 as a 
factor of the probability of errors in reused code with re- 
spect to new code. 
• (K6) Code quality. Readability and compliance of the reused 
code with the required standard with an estimated target 
value of compliance of 100%. 
4. Post-deployment support. The maintenance of the system while 
it is in operation typically spans several years. Railway systems 
are designed to be in operation for more than 20 years; thus, 
there is a need to provide support and reduce maintenance 
both effort and costs. There is a wide degree of diversity among 
the different domains of interest. The maintenance expectations 
are lower in consumer electronics, whereas they are critical in 
the railway domain. The following describes two example met- 
rics for post-deployment support: 
• (K7) Maintenance cost. Total cost and effort associated with 
bugs being detected after deployment using a target reduc- 
tion of 10% to 20% (on average). 
• (K8) Incident response. Time and effort for identifying af- 
fected products from reused code/concepts with an esti- 
mated target reduction of 30% to 50% (on average). 
As discussed below, some of these categories are closely related 
to each other. For example, every improvement in time to market, 
product quality or post-deployment support has a positive impact 
on cost. 
5.2.2. Experimental validity 
Threats to internal validity. To obtain scientifically sound re- 
sults that enable comparison between metrics associated with a 
standard development approach and those associated with our ap- 
proach, it is necessary to perform a study in which comparable 
systems are designed in parallel by equivalent engineering teams. 
However, this method is not feasible within the scope of our work 
or within the scope of the TERESA project because of a lack of re- 
sources required to develop the system addressed in the case study 
twice. Moreover, it is even less feasible to obtain such metrics from 
the development of real products, such as ERTMS/ETCS, for which 
the development and certification costs are several tens of mil- 
lions of Euros and confidentiality is an issue. Therefore, metrics for 
comparison are estimated based on previous knowledge of the im- 
plementation of such systems or their equivalents. This estimation 
is thoroughly elaborated and discussed, including descriptions of 
the considered constraints and assumptions. Therefore, a notable 
threat to the internal validity of this study is the possible lack of 
a common understanding of concepts between the researchers in- 
volved in the development of the approach and the participants. To 
minimize this threat, the quality of certain elements of the train- 
ing and preparation procedures could be improved. One would ex- 
pect that in a real environment setting, an engineer using any en- 
gineering method would have some experience with that method. 
Another potential threat to the study’s internal validity is the in- 
fluence of relationships between the researchers and the partici- 
pants because both are involved in the TERESA project. This issue 
is addressed by including six participants out of the TERESA con- 
sortium. Finally, the definition of the target values of the KPIs may 
influence the results because the participants may not respect the 
evaluation context. This issue could be completely resolved only if 
several evaluation methods are configured to define the target val- 
ues. 
Threats to external validity. As noted by the authors of 
( Wohlin et al., 20 0 0 ), external validity may be used to measure 
whether the results of a certain experiment can be generalized be- 
Fig. 25. Subject dependability engineering background (Q1 and Q2). 
yond the experimental context. Because the proposed approach is 
targeted toward software engineers, one threat to external validity 
lies in the skills of the participants. Most participants possess de- 
pendability expertise. Therefore, it would be constructive to eval- 
uate the approach using participants who are not experts in de- 
pendability engineering. Nevertheless, six participants in the con- 
ducted experiment possess high software engineering skills, and 
the remaining participants previously participated in the devel- 
opment of several software projects with a focus on dependabil- 
ity. Therefore, all the participants may be considered to be at an 
advanced stage in their practice as software engineers; therefore, 
they can be regarded as comparable to the targeted software engi- 
neering population. Other obvious external validity threats are the 
size of the project, the product requirements, the use of the tool 
facilities, and the availability of appropriate artifacts during devel- 
opment. However, these issues are not relevant because the size 
and context of the tasks addressed in the experiment are similar 
to those of typical cases in the industry. In addition, the partici- 
pants were required to complete their assigned tasks during the 
time allotted for the experiment. However, in an industry context, 
software engineers are typically provided sufficient time to address 
the development of a software system. Finally, the significance of 
each KPI and its related class of responses may differ between dif- 
ferent domains. To minimize the influence of this concern, appro- 
priate metrics must be defined and ranked for each application 
domain. Thus, the collected metrics should be objective, measur- 
able, relevant to the targeted project and comparable to the situ- 
ation before using the proposed approach. Success is occasionally 
defined in terms of making progress toward goals; however, more 
often, success is simply the repeated achievement of some level 
of an operational goal (e.g., zero defects, 10/10 customer satisfac- 
tion, etc.). Accordingly, choosing the right KPIs depends on having 
a good understanding of what is important to the domain of inter- 
est or the organization. 
5.2.3. Result and discussion 
Fifteen people completed the questionnaire. A broad range of 
industry sectors was represented, with respondents from railway, 
automotive, metrology and software development sector. Based on 
the responses obtained, depend- ability engineering was an impor- 
tant aspect of the job for all but two participants (left part of Fig. 
25 ). Among these two participants, one is working as project man- 
ager and the other as software engineer. Both of them would be 
engaged in dependability engineering activities in the future and 
hence had started to develop their skills in this field. Overall, 60% 
of the participants had over two years of dependability engineering 
experience and a further 20% had at least one year of experience 
with dependability engineering (right part of Fig. 25 ). All partici- 
pants are familiar with modeling tools. 
With regard to the overall engineering cost, we estimate that 
the development of large and complex systems (ERTMS/ETCS), re- 
spectively intermediate systems, is reduced by an average of 12.5%, 
respectively 30% (left part of Fig. 26 ). The overall engineering cost 
is reduced as follows. During the safety concept, system architec- 
ture, software architecture and module detailed design phases, a 
reduction in the time to formalize and document the design is 
observed using already-developed design patterns that include all 
necessary safety information and reducing the effort required to 
document detailed descriptions by hand. Moreover, a reduction in 
the time and effort associated with verification is also observed be- 
cause the design patterns are already verified and provide a com- 
mon understanding for both designers and verifiers. Finally, a re- 
duction in the time and effort associated with RAMS analysis is 
observed because the design patterns are already verified and pro- 
vide a common understanding for both designers and RAMS engi- 
neers. 
The reduction in development cost at the implementation and 
test phases may be justified by the fact that design patterns are al- 
ready implemented as software (meeting all required coding stan- 
dards), and unit tests are already implemented by means of gener- 
ation mechanisms provided by the modeling tools. Therefore, each 
design pattern is already tested (even unit test results are stored), 
and guidelines for integration tests might be provided. 
Finally, verification and validation activities must be extensively 
tested in different implementations, assuming that design patterns 
are already used in several applications. Therefore, the real test 
unit coverage is higher, and the probability of finding an inte- 
gration test or validation bugs associated with the design pat- 
tern is very low. This reduces the verification or validation effort 
where the correction of bugs is time- and effort-consuming. Note 
that verification and validation consumes approximately 50% of 
the overall project cost for high-integrity-level systems (e.g., SIL4). 
Safety design patterns, such as those selected for the case study 
(data agreement, safety communication layer, etc.), provide a safety 
foundation that is difficult to verify and expensive to validate in 
real system developments. They require the participation of multi- 
ple replicated communication channels, temporal constraints, etc., 
as opposed to system-specific safety functions that commonly per- 
form computations. Therefore, the availability of these key founda- 
tional pre-verified safety design patterns can significantly reduce 
the verification and validation effort for a given system. 
With regard to the percentage of reused code, we estimate 
that during the development of large and complex systems 
(ERTMS/ETCS), resp. intermediate systems, code is reused at an av- 
erage of 12.5%, respectively 43% (right part of Fig. 26 ). The selected 
case study, namely, ERTMS/ETCS on-board railway signaling act- 
ing as a large and complex safety system, is a representative SIL4 
safety embedded system in which multiple design patterns can be 
Fig. 26. Development costs (K1 and K2). 
Fig. 27. Product quality (K3 and K4). 
instantiated. However, ERTMS/ETCS is a highly complex system in 
which most of the software application implements the safety and 
functional requirements established by the standard for interoper- 
ability. Selected and integrated design patterns provide the safety 
skeleton and safety architectural foundation of the system (key 
foundation), where the system-specific application is deployed and 
executed. However, the ratio between system-specific software and 
software that can be provided by design patterns is less than 0.1. 
This is a paradox because other safety subsystems of the train 
that perform intermediate complexity safety functions might be 
developed with a much smaller set of design patterns, although 
the ratio of design-pattern-based safety software compared to 
system-specific safety software might be at least one to one. For 
example, the safety function of a railway traction system (SIL2) act- 
ing as an intermediate safety system has an intermediate complex- 
ity. It must compare already acquired current, voltage and temper- 
ature measurements with given minimum and maximum thresh- 
olds and perform a small set of coherency checks on the measure- 
ments. 
With regard to engineering, we estimate that the development 
of large and complex systems (ERTMS/ETCS), resp. intermediate 
systems, is reduced by an average of 12.5%, respectively 30% (left 
part of Fig. 27 ). 
With regard to the re-engineering, we estimate that the devel- 
opment of large and complex systems (ERTMS/ETCS), respectively 
intermediate systems, is reduced by an average of 25%, respectively 
33% (right part of Fig. 27 ). 
In this study, product quality is measured by two metrics, i.e., 
errors in the reused code and code quality. For the first metric, it is 
estimated that a reduction by a factor of 10 in the probability of er- 
rors in re-used code with respect to new code can be achieved and 
even surpassed if the design pattern is already extensively used in 
multiple applications. Pre-engineered safety design patterns are al- 
ready verified and probably being used extensively in multiple ap- 
plications in which identified bugs have been previously corrected 
and the design pattern has been updated. With regard to the code 
quality, safety design patterns developed by/for an end-user should 
be 100% compliant with the required standards. 
After developing the demonstrator and considering the previous 
estimation of K2 (percentage of reused code), we estimate that the 
maintenance cost is reduced in large and complex (ERTMS/ETCS), 
resp. intermediate systems, by an average of 12.5%, respectively, 
25% (left part of Fig. 28 ). An example is the reduction of complex 
incident responses associated with the operation of safety replicas 
(e.g., data agreement, safety communication layer, etc.) that require 
a considerable amount of time to be analyzed and solved. 
After developing the demonstrator and considering the previ- 
ous estimation of K2 (percentage of reused code) and that safety 
design patterns provide key foundational patterns for the develop- 
ment of safety systems, we estimate that the time and effort for 
incident response is reduced in large and complex (ERTMS/ETCS) 
systems, resp. intermediate systems, by an average of 20%, respec- 
tively, 40% (right part of Fig. 28 ). An example is the reduction 
of complex incident responses associated with the operation of 
safety replicas (e.g., data agreement, safety communication layer, 
etc.) that require a considerable amount of time to be analyzed 
and solved. 
A comparison of the resulting KPIs in the two cases is shown in 
Fig. 29 , where the estimated KPI values for the newly proposed ap- 
proach at the end of the case study are presented. From this com- 
Fig. 28. Post-deployment support (K7 and K8). 
Fig. 29. Intermediate, large&complex safety systems. 
parison, it appears that using the dependability pattern-based ap- 
proach brings significant advantages in dependability engineering, 
especially for intermediate safety systems. 
Embedded system development projects in the railway domain 
are commonly developed by multidisciplinary teams that can be 
geographically dispersed. Therefore, the existence of a repository 
with pre-engineered patterns (designed and verified) can reduce 
the time to market (and overall project cost), ease the complex- 
ity management, reduce the probability of systematic faults and 
increase the robustness of the developed products. Such effects 
are primarily related to each design pattern providing a concise 
representation of a concept (e.g., redundancy, as specified by IEC- 
61,508), and/or well-known and pre-engineered solutions that fit 
naturally within the company’s engineering lifecycle. 
The selected design patterns defined in the context of this case 
study target the development of (railway) safety embedded sys- 
tems and provide either common IEC-61,508-based safety tech- 
niques (e.g., majority voter) or representative safety solutions (e.g., 
hypervisor). Instantiating and thereby reusing existing patterns re- 
duces the cost to develop an application. Therefore, it becomes 
possible to produce results faster and to reduce staff efforts using 
proven solutions and reusing test cases instead of hiring expensive 
dependability engineers. Furthermore, by producing results faster, 
the time to market is reduced. In addition, to increase the chances 
of reducing development costs and the time to market in the fu- 
ture, additional patterns should be defined to extend existing pat- 
terns. It becomes possible to respond to the needs of customers 
and provide the desired patterns. Furthermore, the potential to ex- 
ploit the approach over a long period of time becomes feasible. 
6. Certification 
Depending on the application requirements, different levels of 
assurance can be involved, including the most stringent certifica- 
tion (e.g., EN-5012 for railway systems and DO-178B for airborne 
systems). The certification process is required in all application 
sectors in which a safety function is included. The safety certifi- 
cation of a given safety system requires a demonstration that the 
system is safe for its purpose according to a given safety certifi- 
cation standard, e.g., EN-50,129 for the railway domain. This pro- 
cess requires at least the demonstration that the system has been 
developed according to a safety engineering process lifecycle that 
is compliant with the relevant standard. This lifecycle reduces the 
probability of systematic faults and ensures that the developed sys- 
tem is safe for its purpose using state-of-the-art techniques and 
measures that mitigate, detect and tolerate random and systematic 
faults. 
6.1. Supported safety techniques 
The safety techniques recommended by the IEC-61,508 ( IEC, 
2010b ) safety standard, which can also generally be used in other 
domains, such as EN-5012X railway safety standards. The following 
provides a brief explanation of the given support for each tech- 
nique: 
1. Fault detection and diagnosis. As described by the relevant stan- 
dard ( IEC, 2010b ), the goal is to detect faults in a system that 
might lead to a failure, thus providing the basis for counter- 
measures that can minimize the consequences of failures. This 
approach is supported by safety techniques described by the 
standard (e.g., redundancy TMR) ( IEC, 2010b ) and state-of-the- 
art research ( Kopetz, 2011 ), which provide well-known solu- 
tions to well-known problems that are suitable to be developed 
as safety patterns. Within our approach, the following cross- 
domain fault detection and diagnosis safety patterns are devel- 
oped: TMR, majority voter, reciprocal monitoring, data agree- 
ment and watchdog. 
2. Modular approach (see Table B.9 in ( IEC, 2010b )) . It is assumed 
that safety patterns are developed using a safety engineering 
process lifecycle, thus meeting the given recommendations for 
a modular approach (software module size limit, software com- 
plexity control, information encapsulation, etc.). 
3. Use of trusted / verified software modules and components (if avail- 
able). As described by the relevant standard ( IEC, 2010b ), the 
goal is to avoid the need for software designs and elements to 
be extensively revalidated or redesigned for each new applica- 
tion and to take advantage of a pre-existing software elements 
that are verified for a different application and for which a body 
of verification evidence exists. Safety patterns directly support 
this safety technique, providing trusted/verified software mod- 
ules. Safety patterns should be developed according to an ap- 
propriate safety engineering process and safety integrity level, 
delivered with a body of verification and, whenever possible, a 
use/verification history (based on systems that have previously 
demonstrated successful usage). 
4. Semi-formal methods (see Table B.7 in ( IEC, 2010b )) . It is as- 
sumed that safety patterns are developed using at least semi- 
formal methods, such as UML modeling, finite-state machines 
and sequence diagrams. 
5. Computer-aided design tools (see B.3.5 in ( IEC, 2010b ) . As de- 
scribed by the relevant standard, the goal is to perform the de- 
sign procedure more systematically and to include appropriate 
automatic construction elements that are already available and 
tested. It is assumed that safety patterns are developed using 
a safety engineering process lifecycle and associated computer- 
aided design tools. 
Dependable embedded systems with safety requirements that 
are designed with a semi-formal method, such as UML (that might 
also use trusted/verified software), typically require a complemen- 
tary text description to explain the relevant safety concepts and 
techniques used in the design to be verified by an independent 
team. The use of safety patterns should reduce the probability of 
systematic faults by enabling the representation of safety concepts 
and techniques in such a way that the probability of misunder- 
standing between the design and verification team is reduced. For 
this purpose, safety patterns should clearly represent a safety con- 
cept/technique, be self-contained and be verified by dependability 
experts. 
6.2. Certification scenarios 
It is assumed that the end user has a safety engineering process 
lifecycle that is compliant with the relevant standard and a set of 
qualified safety engineers, which are the minimum requirements to 
proceed with the development and certification of a safety prod- 
uct. As a result, two basic scenarios are defined for the certifi- 
cation of safety embedded systems that use dependability design 
patterns: 
1. In-house-constructed dependability design patterns and repos- 
itory. The end user develops and reuses safety patterns de- 
veloped with the same safety engineering process and tools 
used in the development of safety embedded systems. Al- 
ready developed and verified safety patterns can be reused as 
trusted/verified software modules and components to develop 
certifiable products, reusing the design, development and unit 
test. Safety patterns can also be certified with a modular cer- 
tification approach ( Rushby, 20 07; Althammer et al., 20 08 ) if 
feasible (e.g., black channel safety communication layer (SCL)). 
2. Third-party dependability design patterns and repository. The 
end user integrates and reuses safety patterns developed by 
a trusted third party (commercial, open-source, etc.) using a 
safety engineering process compliant with the safety standard. 
The integration can include defining a modeling perspective 
that is compatible with the end-user safety engineering pro- 
cess (encapsulating the details) or integrating the safety pat- 
tern as is in the design if both processes are sufficiently com- 
patible. For example, the first approach (compatible model per- 
spective) can be used for generic patterns, such as real-time 
operating systems and hypervisors. The decision is dependent 
on the specific project and should consider meeting constraints 
associated with the safety technique that addresses the reuse 
of trusted/verified software modules and components and effi- 
ciency/compatibility criteria from the engineering process per- 
spective. The end user assumes the responsibility of demon- 
strating that integrated design patterns are safe for their pur- 
pose, which can require a large effort if integrated design pat- 
terns are not certifiable. 
The availability of safety patterns that have been previously cer- 
tified (certifiable or, if possible, modular certification) can further 
improve the development and certification effort by reducing the 
associated cost and effort to a minimum. If the safety pattern has 
already been certified (modular certification), the end user requires 
a modeling representation to be used in the design (compatibility 
of engineering process), verifies the appropriate use of the safety 
pattern (meeting constraints and hypotheses stated in the modular 
certification) and defines/executes the necessary integration tests. 
However, the internal design, development and unit test that are 
part of the modular certification can potentially be taken ’as is’, 
and the provider should provide the required documentation to 
support the certification and additional test frameworks to be ex- 
ecuted and passed in each certification project (e.g., to check soft- 
ware correctness for a given processor). For example, this is appli- 
cable to certifiable real-time operating systems and safety patterns 
developed within the scope of our experiment (e.g., safety commu- 
nication layer (SCL)). 
7. Related work 
The ideas of system architecture and dependability modeling 
and analysis are not new. However, to the best of our knowledge, 
the combination of model-based and pattern-based dependability 
engineering is new. In this section, we describe our vision in these 
areas and discuss their relationship to software system engineer- 
ing and pattern-based engineering. The pattern concept was first 
introduced by Alexander et al. (1977 ). A pattern addresses a spe- 
cific, recurring problem in the design or implementation of a soft- 
ware system. It captures expertise in the form of reusable archi- 
tecture design themes and styles that can be reused even when 
algorithms, component implementations, or frameworks cannot. 
7.1. Incorporating dependability in system and software engineering 
Over the past two decades, the need for formally defined safety 
lifecycle processes has emerged because the inevitable require- 
ment for better processes eventually pushed control systems to 
a level of complexity in which sophisticated electronics and pro- 
grammable systems became the optimal solution for control and 
safety protection ( Smith and Simpson, 2004 ). With these emergent 
requirements, many safety lifecycles have been proposed by dif- 
ferent associations, such as IEC and ANSI/ISA. These safety lifecy- 
cles have been adopted by different domains or companies with 
some modifications to adapt different requirements (for example, 
domain-specific requirements). However, because the fundamental 
differences between a traditional development process and a safety 
lifecycle are immense, e.g., different types of safety checks and 
the safety relationships between these checks and phases, model- 
ing these different saf ety lif ecycles with traditionally used process 
metamodels is not simple and direct. 
In system engineering, dependability may be compromised in 
several system layers. Dependability is typically considered when 
design decisions are made, leading to potential conflicting sit- 
uations. The integration of dependability features requires the 
availability of simultaneous system architecture expertise, domain- 
specific application knowledge and dependability expertise to 
manage the potential consequences of design decisions on the de- 
pendability of a system and on the remainder of the architec- 
ture. For example, at the architectural level, incorporating depend- 
ability means having a mechanism (which may be a component 
or integrated into a component). Development processes for sys- 
tem and software construction are common knowledge and main- 
stream practice in most development organizations. Unfortunately, 
these processes offer little support for meeting dependability re- 
quirements. Over the years, research efforts have been invested in 
methodologies and techniques for dependable software engineer- 
ing, although dedicated processes have been proposed only re- 
cently ( Bernardi et al., 2012; Panesar-Walawege et al., 2013; Ni et 
al., 2015 ). 
7.2. Pattern-based development 
The supporting research activities in PBSE examine three dis- 
tinct challenges: (a) mining (discovering patterns from existing 
systems), (b) hatching (selection of the appropriate pattern), and 
(c) applying (effective use during the system development pro- 
cess). These three challenges often involve broad core expertise, in- 
cluding formal logic, mathematics, stochastic modeling, graph the- 
ory, hardware design and software engineering. In our work, we 
study only the last two challenges, targeting the (i) development 
of an extendible design language for modeling patterns in depend- 
able distributed embedded systems ( Hamid et al., 2016 ) and (ii) 
a methodology to improve existing development processes using 
patterns ( Hamid et al., 2013 ). The language must capture the core 
elements of the pattern to support its (a) precise specification, (b) 
appropriate selection and (c) seamless integration and use. The 
first aspect is related to pattern definition, whereas the second 
and third aspects are more related to problem definition. From 
the pattern-based system and software engineering methodolog- 
ical perspective, only a few works ( Abowd et al., 1995; Soundara- 
jan and Hallstrom, 2004; Zdun and Avgeriou, 2008 ) have addressed 
this concern. They are harmonized with the use of patterns in each 
system and software development lifecycle stage. However, exist- 
ing approaches using patterns often target one stage of develop- 
ment (architecture, design or implementation) due to the lack of 
formalisms ensuring (1) the specification of a pattern at different 
levels of abstraction, (2) relationships that govern their interactions 
and complementarity and (3) the relationship between patterns 
and other artifacts manipulated during the development lifecycle 
and those related to the assessment of critical systems. 
Several approaches exist in the dependability design pattern lit- 
erature ( Giacomo et al., 2008; Daniels and Vouks, 1997; Tichy et 
al., 2004 ). They allow solutions to very general problems that ap- 
pear frequently as sub-tasks in the design of systems with secu- 
rity and dependability requirements. These elementary tasks in- 
clude safety communication and fault tolerance. In developing 
fault-tolerant software applications, the use of patterns leads to 
well-structured applications; ( Daniels and Vouks, 1997 ) described 
a hybrid set of patterns to be used in the development of fault- 
tolerant software applications. These patterns are based on clas- 
sical fault-tolerant strategies, such as N-version programming, re- 
covery blocks, consensus, and voting. In addition, the hybrid pat- 
tern structure can be constructed through a recursive combina- 
tion of N -version programming and others. They also addressed 
the power of the technique in support of advanced software vot- 
ing techniques. Extending this framework, ( Tichy et al., 2004 ) pro- 
posed a framework for the development of dependable software 
systems based on a pattern approach. They reused proven fault- 
tolerant techniques via fault-tolerant patterns. They demonstrated 
their framework using an application to guide the self-repair of a 
system after the detection of a node crash. 
In Kodituwakku et al. (2003 ), a mathematical structure was pro- 
posed for the organization of patterns depending on several cate- 
gories. An ontological approach for selecting design patterns was 
proposed in Girardi and Lindoso (2006 ) to facilitate understanding 
and reuse during software development. In their paper, the authors 
presented an ontology that describes the design pattern format 
and their relationships. They used a pattern system/language to fa- 
cilitate the design, integration, selection and reuse of these pat- 
terns. A multidimensional classification based on architectural lev- 
els, concerns, stages, and other aspects was described in VanHilst 
et al. (2009 ). Another aspect that has been considered is sys- 
tem perspectives. Based on the idea of the Zachman framework 
( Zachman, 1987 ) (classification based on system perspectives and 
interrogatives), the Microsoft patterns and practices group classi- 
fication ( Trowbridge et al., 2004 ) distinguishes the following ele- 
ments: (a) merits (clearly identifies the context of each pattern and 
helps identify missing patterns), (b) flaws (more dedicated to func- 
tional patterns; non-functional patterns tend to cover many levels 
of system development and many interrogatives), and (c) improve- 
ment (add icons in each pattern to provide classifications). 
In the context of patterns in dependable software system devel- 
opment, ( Serrano et al., 2008 ) explained how pattern integration 
can be achieved using a library of precisely described and formally 
verified solutions. Conceptually, our modeling framework is similar 
to that proposed in Serrano et al. (2008 ). Nevertheless, they used a 
rigid structure (a pattern was defined as a quadruplet), and conse- 
quently, their approach is not usable for capturing specific char- 
acteristics of patterns for several domains. Another attempt was 
made by Boussaidi and Mili (2005 ), who created a metamodel for 
both the problem and the design pattern. Then, using a mapping 
between the two models, they were able to create an integrated 
model using model transformations. Although we found similari- 
ties between this approach and ours, we wanted to go further than 
the transformation by defining a full process for a proven integra- 
tion and be able (within this defined process) to allow the user 
to freely alter the automatic result while always checking the final 
correctness. 
Usually, these design artifacts are provided as a library of mod- 
els (sub-systems) and as a system of patterns (framework) in the 
more elaborate approaches. However, there remains a lack of mod- 
eling languages and/or formalisms dedicated to specifying these 
design artifacts and understanding their reuse in software devel- 
opment automation. More precisely, a gap between the develop- 
ment of systems using patterns and the pattern information re- 
mains. Most patterns are expressed in a textual form, as informal 
indications on how to solve individual design problems. Some of 
them use more precise representations based on UML diagrams, 
although these patterns do not include sufficient semantic descrip- 
tions to automate their processing and to extend their use. Fur- 
thermore, the correct application of a pattern is not guaranteed 
because the description does not consider the effects of interac- 
tions, adaptation and combination, making them inappropriate for 
automated processing within a tool-supported development pro- 
cess. Finally, due to manual pattern implementation, the problem 
of incorrect implementation (the most important source of safety 
issues) remains unresolved. 
Recently, Hauge, (2014 ) presented a pattern-based approach 
called Safe Control Systems (SaCS) for the development of concep- 
tual safety designs. The SaCS provides three artifacts: (1) a pro- 
cess for the systematic application of patterns as development sup- 
port; (2) a set of patterns in the form of a library; and (3) a pat- 
tern language to define patterns and to specify the application of 
patterns for safety design conceptualization. This work is similar 
to our work in its goal, e.g., determining the level of abstraction 
and life-cycle stage in which the pattern is used and how to de- 
fine relationships between patterns in order to efficiently com- 
bine them. These two works are complementary and their integra- 
tion should improve the existing pattern-based development ap- 
proaches. A successful application of our framework attempts to 
demonstrate the resulting opportunity for applying pattern-based 
development combined with the benefits of model-based engineer- 
ing. 
7.3. Model-driven engineering and domain-specific language 
The modeling concept is becoming a major paradigm in sys- 
tem engineering, particularly in system software engineering ( Selic, 
2003; Schmidt, 2006; France and Rumpe, 2007 ). Its use represents 
a significant advance in terms of the level of abstraction, continu- 
ity, and generality. It offers tools to address the development of 
complex systems, improving their quality and reducing their de- 
velopment cycles ( Liebel et al., 2014 ). Modeling languages based 
on precise metamodels and transformations are key elements of 
MDE ( Atkinson and Ku ¨hne, 2003 ). With the use of modeling lan- 
guages, software engineering models a particular system with the 
goal to be complete and accurate in the context of the system re- 
quirements. If done properly, model-driven engineering allows this 
model to be verified using formal analysis or execution and, later, 
to generate the source code required to implement the system via 
transformations ( Selic, 2003; France and Rumpe, 2007 ). Domain- 
specific languages (DSLs) ( France and Rumpe, 2005; Gray et al., 
2007 ) are languages that are specifically tailored to the needs of a 
particular problem or application domain. Domain experts can un- 
derstand, validate, modify, test, and sometimes even develop such 
languages. DSLs are frequently used in MDE ( Selic, 2003 ). 
The importance of models and MDE in dependability engineer- 
ing was highlighted by Gran et al. (2007 ); Hamid et al. (2008 ) and 
Biehl et al. (2010 ), and confirmed in a recent empirical study on 
the state of modeling in the embedded domain ( Bernardi et al., 
2012; Panesar-Walawege et al., 2013; Liebel et al., 2014; Ni et al., 
2015 ) because code generation and simulation are heavily used; 
the use of modeling in that field has been reported as highly pos- 
itive. In this context, ( Bernardi et al., 2012 ) proposed a UML pro- 
file compliant with MARTE ( OMG, 2011b ) to address dependabil- 
ity analysis and modeling. Such a profile allows one to conduct 
a quantitative dependability analysis of software systems mod- 
eled with UML. They focus on the following facets of dependabil- 
ity: reliability, availability and safety. In Hamid et al., (2008 ), we 
proposed a methodology that associates a model-driven approach 
with component- based development to design distributed appli- 
cations with fault-tolerant requirements. UML-based modeling is 
used to capture application structure and related non-functional 
requirements thanks to the complementary profile called the FT 
profile, which is an extension of a subset of QoS&FT and uses the 
NFP (non-functional properties) sub-profile of MARTE (profile for 
modeling and analysis of real-time embedded systems). Stereo- 
types dedicated to fault tolerance specify the fault-detection pol- 
icy, replication management style and replica group management. 
From this model descriptor, files are generated (according to the 
deployment and configuration standard (D&C)) to build boot code 
(static deployment) that instantiates, configures and connects com- 
ponents and to load configured components. Within this process, 
component replication and FT properties are declaratively specified 
at the model level and are transparent for the component imple- 
mentation. 
7.4. Pattern modeling languages 
The first attempt to model patterns is the GoF ( Gamma et al., 
1995 ), where each pattern is described by UML diagrams. However, 
there are only natural texts and a few examples to link the dia- 
grams together and explain the integration. This is not sufficient 
for our objectives. Therefore, UMLAUT was proposed by Guennec 
et al., (20 0 0 ) as an approach to formally model design patterns by 
proposing extensions to the UML metamodel 1.3. They used OCL 
language to describe structural and behavioral constraints. These 
constraints are defined using metamodels of specified UML ele- 
ments via meta collaboration diagrams. The mechanisms of asso- 
ciation of these meta-level diagrams to their instance levels (in- 
stances of design patterns) are then defined, allowing one to model 
design patterns accurately via the UML language. This work is il- 
lustrated through two examples of design patterns: visitor and ob- 
server. 
By specifying design patterns as metamodels and defining a set 
of features to handle the models, the RBML (role-based metamod- 
eling language) proposed by Kim et al., (2003 ) attempts to bridge 
the gap between the pattern and its use. The RBML formalism, 
which is based on UML, is able to precisely capture various design 
perspectives of patterns, such as static structure, interactions, and 
state-based behavior. Each one is characterized by a specific RBML 
metamodel type: (1) SPS (static pattern specifications) is a struc- 
tural design pattern specification that allows one to express the 
static view, (2) IPS (interaction pattern specification) represents the 
design pattern in terms of possible interactions between different 
roles, and (3) SMPS (state machine pattern specifications) can add 
a behavioral perspective to describe the various states in which a 
pattern may lie in its execution. However, the integration by itself 
remains not clearly defined. 
Another issue raised in DPML (design pattern modeling lan- 
guage) ( Mapelsden et al., 2002 ) and in LePUS ( Gasparis et al., 
2008 ) is visualization. These languages both use a combination 
of modeling and metamodeling. In Gasparis et al., (2008 ), a for- 
mal and visual language called LePUS was presented for specify- 
ing design patterns. It defines a pattern in an accurate and com- 
plete based on a formula in Z with a graphical representation. A 
diagram in LePUS is a graph whose nodes correspond to variables 
and whose arcs are labeled with binary relations. The framework 
promoted by LePUS is interesting, although the degree of expres- 
siveness proposed to capture the intent and abstract the solution 
of a pattern is too restrictive. In addition, there is a lack of rela- 
tionship between the pattern and its instantiation. With regard to 
the integration of patterns in software systems, the DPML (design 
pattern modeling language) ( Mapelsden et al., 2002 ) allows the in- 
corporation of patterns in UML models. 
The recently completed FP6 SERENITY project has introduced a 
new notion of security and dependability (S&D) patterns. SEREN- 
ITY’s S&D patterns are precise specifications of validated S&D 
mechanisms including a precise behavioral description, references 
to the S&D properties, constraints on the context required for de- 
ployment, information describing how to adapt and monitor the 
mechanism, and trust mechanisms. The S&D SERENITY pattern is 
specified following several levels of abstraction to bridge the gap 
between abstract solution and implementation. These abstraction 
levels are S&D classes, S&D patterns and S&D implementation. 
Such validated S&D patterns and the formal characterization of 
their behavior and semantics can also be the basic building blocks 
for S&D engineering in embedded systems. Serrano et al. (2008 ) 
explained how this can be achieved using a library of precisely 
described and formally verified security and dependability (S&D) 
solutions, i.e., S&D classes, S&D patterns, S&D implementation and 
S&D integration schemes. Moreover, Giacomo et al. (2008 ) reported 
an empirical experience regarding the adoption and elicitation of 
S&D patterns in the air traffic management (ATM) domain, demon- 
strating the power of using patterns as guidance to structure the 
analysis of operational aspects when used at the design stage. 
Existing formalization attempts for patterns ( Mikkonen, 1998; 
Soundarajan and Hallstrom, 2004 ) fall short in handling the inher- 
ent variability in pattern descriptions ( Zdun and Avgeriou, 2008 ), 
and they focus primarily on a very limited design and architecture 
pattern scope. They do not yet address specific domains, such as 
security and safety. For the first type of approach ( Gamma et al., 
1995 ), design patterns are usually represented by diagrams with 
specific notations, such as UML object diagrams, that are accompa- 
nied by textual descriptions and examples of code to complete the 
description. Furthermore, their structure is rigid (context, structure, 
solution, etc.). Unfortunately, the use and/or application of a pat- 
tern can be difficult or inaccurate. In fact, the existing descriptions 
are not formal definitions and sometimes leave ambiguities regard- 
ing the exact meaning of the patterns. There are some promising 
and well-proven approaches ( Douglass, 1998 ) based on Gamma et 
al., (1995 ). However, this type of technique does not afford the 
high degree of flexibility in the pattern structure that is required to 
reach our objectives. Thus far, patterns have been used in system- 
atic engineering approaches for various tasks, such as classification 
and organization, pattern selection based on security requirements 
( Weiss and Mouratidis, 2008 ), analyzing and modeling security re- 
quirements ( Cheng et al., 2003 ), and measuring the introduced se- 
curity level ( Fernandez et al., 2010 ). A similar situation is prevalent 
for safety patterns, which are surveyed in Preschern et al. (2013, 
2014 ) and formalized in Armoush, (2010 ). In Daniels and Vouks 
(1997 ) and Tichy et al. (2004 ), the pattern specification consists of 
a service-based architectural design and deployment restrictions in 
the form of UML deployment diagrams for different architectural 
services. Conceptually, our modeling framework is similar to that 
proposed in the SERENITY project. Nevertheless, the pattern struc- 
ture is rigid (a pattern is defined as quadruplet) and is thus un- 
usable for capturing specific characteristics of S&D patterns. How- 
ever, the SERENITY project proposes several levels of abstraction 
to bridge the gap between abstract solution and implementation, 
which intends to not capture a common representation of patterns 
for several domains. 
From a different point of view, we agree with the argumenta- 
tions given in Zdun and Avgeriou, (2005 ) to justify why the pre- 
cise specification and formalization of a pattern by definition re- 
stricts its “degree of freedom for the design”, and hence there are 
no success stories of works dealing with pattern development. This 
is not only related to dependability patterns. Note however, that 
these works do not address the validation activity which is an im- 
portant issue in any design activity and more particularly in de- 
pendability engineering. We claim that dependability is subject to 
rigorous and precise specification and the proposed literature (to 
the best of our knowledge) fails to meet these two objectives. To 
remedy these contradictory needs, we support the specifications 
of dependability patterns at two levels of abstractions, domain- 
independent and domain-specific, in a semi-formal representation 
through metamodeling techniques. This allows to support some 
variability of the pattern, and hence to foster reuse. 
8. Conclusion 
In this paper, we propose a pattern-based development ap- 
proach to address dependability through a model-driven engineer- 
ing approach. The approach is composed of several steps and is 
based on metamodeling techniques that enable the specification 
of dependability patterns. It is also based on model transforma- 
tion techniques for the purposes of generation. The defined meta- 
model points to a common representation for several contexts of 
use. First, this approach aims to allow design automation through 
the reuse of a dependable application. Second, it aims to overcome 
the lack of formalism in a conventional text-based approach. The 
approach empowers system and software engineers to reuse so- 
lutions for dependability without specific knowledge of how the 
solution is designed and implemented. This feature enables one to 
work at a higher abstraction level, which may significantly reduce 
the cost of engineering a particular system. 
We begin by specifying a conceptual model of the desired pat- 
terns and proceed by designing modeling languages that are ap- 
propriate for the content. The results of these efforts are then used 
to specify and define the dependability as a pattern (e.g., in the 
form of properties, design diagrams, etc.). Developing an applica- 
tion using pattern-based development processes and thus reusing 
existing patterns requires finding and tailoring suitable patterns 
into a form that is appropriate for the targeted development en- 
vironment. The integration phase of our approach allows a do- 
main engineer to reuse the resultant patterns that have been pre- 
viously adapted and transformed for a given engineering environ- 
ment (development platform) to develop a domain-specific appli- 
cation. Thus, we provide an overall pattern- based system engi- 
neering (PBSE) framework and an operational architecture for a 
tool suite to support the proposed approach. An example of such a 
tool suite, called Semcomdt, is constructed using EMFT and a CDO- 
based repository and is currently provided in the form of Eclipse 
plugins. In addition, the tool suite promotes the separation of con- 
cerns during the development process by distinguishing the stake- 
holder roles. Access to the repository is customized with regard 
to the development phases, the stakeholders domain and system 
knowledge 
Furthermore, we evaluate the usefulness of the patterns for in- 
creasing engineering productivity. The dependability captured in a 
pattern (e.g., in the form of properties, design solutions, etc.) is 
based on its generality, i.e., we determine whether the same de- 
sign solution can be successfully used to instantiate the railway 
safety sector engineering processes and whether they can be used 
to instantiate other processes. We intend to demonstrate that the 
dependability pattern-based approach leads to a reduced number 
or to a simplification of the engineering process steps. The design 
solutions that are provided should support the developer regarding 
dependability issues and reduce the error frequency. We demon- 
strate that the application of the proposed approach brings impor- 
tant benefits to development engineers. This statement is demon- 
strated via the implementation of the demonstrator. First evidence 
from the case study and the key performance indicator survey in- 
dicates that users are satisfied with the pattern-based approach. 
The approach paves the way to allow users to define their own 
road-maps based on the PBSE methodology. The first evaluations 
are encouraging. However, they also highlight one of the main 
challenges, i.e., the automatic search for the user to derive those 
“dependability patterns” from the requirement analysis. However, 
being aware of all functionality benefits requires years of experi- 
ence in the practical industry. Because model-driven engineering 
is not yet common in all embedded domains, it becomes more dif- 
ficult to find acceptance among companies accustomed to manu- 
ally implementing software solutions. However, this methodology 
will become increasingly common, and our approach contributes 
to the exploitation of this engineering methodology in future. The 
practical case study in this paper shows that the developed tools 
can be successfully used to support the entire engineering process. 
The SEMCO tools can be adapted to a domain’s engineering pro- 
cesses, and the provided transformation techniques make it possi- 
ble to support several target platforms. The extension to industry 
companies in different domains is given by the extendibility and 
flexibility of the tools offered by the SEMCO tool suite. The follow- 
ing steps aim to garner acceptance in the industry and to extend 
our approach to industry companies. 
Finally, we discuss the pattern-based approach for certification 
support, arguing that our approach may provide artifacts to ease 
the certification and sketching future directions in this regard. Pat- 
terns have supported application engineers in generating the doc- 
uments required by the certification authority. Even the certifica- 
tion phase may profit from our approach. For the evaluator, the 
use of well-structured and formally validated patterns and their di- 
rect contribution to development process documentation can has- 
ten the evaluation work. 
In our future work, we plan to study the automation of the 
model search and tailoring tasks, and a framework allowing a sim- 
pler specification of constraints would be beneficial. Our vision is 
for patterns to be inferred from the browsing history of users and 
constructed from a set of previously developed applications. As we 
look to the future, we can use existing work on reuse scenarios and 
design space exploration ( Tomer et al., 2004; Hegedu ¨s et al., 2015; 
Hamid, 2015 ). We would also like to study the integration of our 
tools with other MDE tools. The objective is to show the process 
flow and the integration of the tools in the domain tool chains, 
whereas the intention is not to resolve the low-level details of the 
approach integration. For that purpose, we must implement other 
types of software and means of generating validated artifacts, such 
as programming language code and certification artifacts, that are 
capable of producing a restrictive set of artifacts that comply with 
domain standards. The required pattern representation at the same 
level may differ from one domain to another; thus the access tool 
is responsible for providing the information in the required format. 
The layout of the access tool depends on the sector particularities; 
thus, a new “skin” must be defined every time a new sector is con- 
sidered. Moreover, the access tool must be extended with a trans- 
formation capability for different toolsets. We would also like to 
study the preservation of design decisions through modeling ar- 
tifacts ( That et al., 2014 ). Concurrently, more sophisticated tech- 
niques to derive artifact relationships can be implemented, possi- 
bly using different domains, to reduce the complexity of designing 
systems of modeling artifacts. Additionally, we will seek new op- 
portunities to apply the proposed approach to other domains. This 
requires an instantiation of the full software engineering tool and 
method and an evaluation across the experiences of many users 
across many domains. Finally, we would like to enhance the pro- 
posed integration process by automating the detection of conflicts 
between the modeling artifact structure and the existing applica- 
tion architecture and propose solutions in a manner similar to that 
in which the merging tools operate. 
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